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LEGAL LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
By CoivIN P. Rousn*
The last decade and a half has witnessed a number of new
customs in the business world which have intimately affected
the work of the public accountant. The urgent and immediate
needs of financing the World War, with the resulting tax upon
incomes, brought about an increased demand for professional
services of this kind. In order to determine the amount of this
tax, it is necessary to determine the tax base the income upon
which it is paid. The nationalization of business with its at-
tendant deluge of consolidations, sales, and mergers of various
business units has increased the demand for the services of the
accountant as a consultant. Whereas formerly a great part of
the time of the principals of an accounting firm was occupied
out of the office, in the performance of the details of an audit,
that is no longer the case. Instead that work has now been
largely delegated by the principals, and their whole attention
given to consultation and office practice. The tax work above
mentioned has as an incident the prosecution of bases before the
Treasury Department' and the United States Board of Tax
Appeals. Here again the work of the lawyer and the accountant
* Member of the Kentucky Bar; B. S. in Commerce, University of
Kentucky, 1926; LL. B., University of Kentucky, 1928; Graduate Stu-
dent In Economics, University of Chicago, Summer Session, 1928; As-
sistant Professor of Economics, University of Kentucky, 1928-31; UnI-
versity Fellow, Columbia University Law School, 1931-32; LL. M.,
Columbia University Law School, 1932.
1"In business eorganizations and in tax matters the business
iaan more and more relies upon the accountant as his counselor."
Lawyers must be specifically admitted to the United States Treasury
Bar. This admission is extended to the accountants as freely as to
lawyers. Robert H. Jordan, N. Y. State Bar Association Bulletin, Feb-
ruary, 1931.
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has developed an interdependence between the two professions. 2
Finally the recognition by bankers, and business men, of the
value of financial statements for credit purposes has greatly
augmented the demand for the accountant's services.3
The organization of the individual office within the profes-
sion has proceeded upon lines that will carry into effect the
-rendition of the services above outlined. The functions might
be divided into five classes: (a) general office routine; (b) gen-
eral accounting and audit work; (c) installation of cost sys-
tems and efficiency work; (d) consultation and investigation;
(e) income tax work. In the large firms there will perhaps be
a partner directing the activities of each of these departments.
4
They delegate their duties in a large measure to subordinates.
The classification of the personnel performing the accounting
work varies with the size of the firms and also within a class it
will vary from firm to firm. In addition to the partners, how-
ever, there might be managers, seniors, semi-seniors, juniors,
and in the language of the profession, "temps". All above
the class ok semi-seniors will likely have been examined by gov-
ermental authority and certified as public accountants. Some
within that group might also have achieved this status. The
so-called "temps" are those that are only temporarily em-
ployed, usually upon a three months engagement, for the sea-
sonal peak of the accounting work.
The changes that have demanded such a variation in the
accounting practice, have stressed the need of selecting the high-
est type of personnel for the profession. This fact along with
the seasonal nature of the work has placed the principals in a
rather baffling dilemma. Their reputation for thorough and ac-
curate work, perhaps gained painfully and slowly, is naturally
at stake when much important work must be delegated in 'its
performance. The exigencies of the intensive engagements, in
2 2The lack of training upon the part of the legal profession in the
theory and practice of accounting is often stressed. Some of the large
law schools are attempting to meet this need by offering lecture
courses in accounting. Some doubt the adequacy of a training in the
theory of accounting that omits the actual solution of practice prob-
lems. Even though lawyers are not going to be bookkeepers, that
practice is considered by some essential for a mastery of the subjeci.
A pre-legal training in the subject should meet the need.
S.See the discussion by George S. Olive, in "Conduct of An Account-
ing Practice," a bulletin of "The Amercian Institute of Accountants."
'.See Kester, Vol. III, c. 12, p. 423.
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which a vast amount of work is to be perforihed in a very short
period of time, involving long hours and perhaps'inconvenient
living coiiditions, call for the highest esprit de corp upon the
part of the staff. It is desirable to develop a leadership upon
the part of the seniors that will enable the younger members
to feel that they are working with them rather than for them in
the interest of the client. Such leadership and such a spirit is
very difficult to maintain in the cases of the large firms employ-
ing a large force for a limited engagement. Indeed it has been
said that it is impossible to obtain the right calibre of men for
the accounting profession as long as it is the custom to engage
assistants for a temporary period. The very fact that they
are open to engagement upon these terms is offered as evidence
that they are not of the proper ability.5 This is not necessarily
true. There are undoubtedly many within the ranks of those
temporarily employed who are so thoroughly obsessed with the
desire to "find a place" within the accounting profession that
they are willing to endure the bad fortune of seasonal employ-
ment rather than fill some other position. However, regardless
of the reason for their existence, the conditions demanding sea-
sonal employment are a just cause for concern by the members
of the profession.
And indeed the members of the profession have given it
serious thought and have taken steps to eliminate seasonal em-
ployment. By inducing some of their clients, when the business
permits, to adopt a "natural business year" for a fiscal period,
many audits can be made at a time other than the end of the
calendar year. The mid-winter peak is thus alleviated to an
extent. Arrangements for current audits throughout the year
may also be used by the smaller firms for the same purpose. A
third factor lessening the seasonal character of the work is the
fact that the government authorities have no special time of the
year for raising objections and fling complaints in tax matters.
These complaints often call for an investigation and possibly
for a defense, and they are in no wise controlled either by a
fiscal period or a calendar year.
Some of those who desire the elimination of the temporarily
employed from the ranks of the accounting profession also doubt
the necessity for the employment of "juniors" by the moderate
Ofupra, note (3).
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and smaller offices. It is argued that much of the detailed work
customarily performed by that class is unnecessary in an audit,
provided the one making it has experience and uses discretion.
Under these circumstances the quality of the work would be
better because all parts of it would be performed by men well
qualified by experience and training. For the performance of
the audit, there should be one in charge to supervise it to its
completion. This supervision is not necessarily left entirely to
his judgment. There would be a number of matters which
should be submitted to one of the principals of the firm. This,
with modern means of communication, is not a difficult task.
After the audit is completed and a report is written, it, with the
working papers, should be submitted to one of the principals in
charge for examination and approval. Each step of this routine
is considered important by members of the profession as a pro-
tection against criticism and as a precaution to insure accu-
racy. The engagements of the average size firm do not require
so many men but that each will receive a wide range of experi-
ence in handling the accounts of many different kinds of busi-
nesses. The audits will naturally include industrial, mercantile,
financial, and public utility organizations, as well as the quasi-
public, eleemosynary institutions. While thus receiving a wide
general experience, opportunities for specialization are also of-
fered, both of which are conducive to efficiency in the work.
The audit working papers are among the most important
instruments used by the accountant in making an audit. It is
from these record9 that the reports which he makes are written.
They also constitute the source of his chief defense in case of
criticism of the- way the audit has been conducted. Aside from
this, they often prove a valuable source of information in mak-
ing future audits. For these reasons, it is desirable, and it is
the practice, to bind and store the working papers of the im-
portant audits when the circumstances will permit. They should
include a full record of the questions raised in the audit and
the manner of their disposal. They belong exclusively to the
auditor, and their contents should not be disclosed by members
of tlie staff save upon the consent of one of the principals. If
the information contained therein is disclosed to one other than
the client, it is the practice to gain his consent before doing so.
And indeed, this literary property in the audit working papers
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may be asserted by the auditor against the client. In the case
of Ipswich Mills v. William Dillon, et al.,6 the defendants had
been retained for a number of years by the plaintiff to make an
annual audit, make tax returns, and perform other services in
the matter of bookkeeping, cost accounting, and the preparation
of statements for banks. Upon one occasion they conducted a
tax case for plaintiff before the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
At a later date a Federal Revenue agent was making an exami-
nation of plaintiff's income tax returns for that year. The
plaintiff sent the agent to the defendant's office to secure the
audit working papers used in the tax case. Upon the defend-
ant's refusal to deliver the papers, the plaintiff tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to obtain them by legal process.
The content of the working papers will depend in a large
degree upon the nature of the audit that is made. If the pur-
pose of the audit is to detect embezzlement, a thorough and de-
tailed investigation will likely be made. On the other hand, if
the purpose is to effect a reorganization; or for the purchase or
sale of a business; or for the issue of new securities, it is likely
that a "Balance Sheet" audit will be made.7 The courts have
recognized that an auditor should be fully instructed upon the
purpose of an audit as the procedure is controlled thereby. In
Teacher v. Calder~a the plaintiff lent the defendant thirty-five
thousand pounds, under an agreement that the plaintiff was to
receive interest and a right to share in the profits. The agree-
ment also provided that the finding of profits by a certain firm
of auditors should be considered final. The member of the firm
of auditors who received the instructions died, and the junior
accountant who performed the audit testified that the memo-
randum of instruction had been misplaced, and that had he
known the real purpose of the audit his course of investigation
would have been changed. Upon this testimony the court
directed that the finding of profit shown by the audit should be
set aside and another accounting rendered.
The maintenance of a permanent staff of report writers
is also necessary for the performance of the work of public ac-
countants. If in the estimation of inventories decimals are
6157 N. E. (Wass.) 604 (127).
'Audit Working Papers, J. Hugh Jackson. See also the studies of
Palmer and Bell.
'A (1899) A. C. 451.
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used, the consequence of the omission by a typist of the decimal
point is readily perceived. For instance, the quantity of a bulky
article like coal might be estimated by a surveyor, reduced to
cubic feet, and calculated in terms of tons. It is quite possible
that some estimate as 20,200.2 tons would be reached. If there
were many such estimates carried into the final statement, and
reduced to a pecuniary value, one may readily appreciate the
necessity for having well trained and accurate reporting typists
and proof readers. Instances have been cited of errors of this
kind amounting to millions of dollars.8 Perhaps the better
practice is to omit the decimal in the estimates; It is safer to
omit, and its use is of doubtful value. To summarize, the or-
ganization of the personnel, its selection, the proper planning of
work so as to avoid the seasonal rush, the proper use and content
of working papers, and the proper reporting of audits after they
are made, are important.
(1) TnE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROPESSION OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANT. *
In the accounting profession there are no legal require-
ments to be complied with before entering the practice, as in the
case of law or medicine. This is true both in England and in*
America. Though anyone has the privilege of engaging in the
practice, there are organizations whose purposes are the estab-
lishment and maintenance of the standards of professional ef-
ficiency. In England there are two groups, and their members
are known as "chartered" accountants and "incorporated" ac-
countants. The former are members of the "Institute of Char-
tered Accountants in England and Wales.". This society was
incorporated by Royal Charter in 1880. The second class men-
tioned, are members of a society incorporated under the Com-
panies Act of 1862.9
In America the state governments have enacted certain
measures designed to improve the standards of the profession,
Upon complying with the requirements of the State Boards, or-
ganized under these measures, a member of the profession may
receive a degree of "Certified Public Accountant". This is a
coveted distinction in the profession, and the state may prohibit
8 See the discussion of John Flint, supra, note (3).
'Bevin on Negligence, Vol. II, p. 1326 (4th ed., 1928).
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anyone from holding himself out as a "C. P. A." unless he has
received a certificate from the State Board of Examiners.
10
Of course the state cannot exercise this regulation beyond its
jurisdiction. In State ex rel. of Atty. General v. Scott" the
State Board of Examiners for North Carolina attempted to give
an examination in the District of Columbia. It seemed that the
questions that were going to be used in this examination were
duplicates of those used in the North Carolina examination the
week before, and that they were available to the applicants in
the Washington examination. The Board asserted its right to do
so because the statute provided that examinations might be held
by the Board as often as necessary, "at such times and places
as it might designate". The court quite properly construed
this by inserting the words "within the State" and issued the
restraining order that was asked.
Not only does the State Board have the right to grant the
privilege of holding oneself out as a "C. P. A.", but it may re-
voke that privilege if the statute which created it so provides.
In denying a bill to restrain the defendant Board of Examiners
from hearing charges preferred against plaintiff by other mem-
bers of the profession, Lehmann v. State Board of Pubtic Ac-
countancy,12 pointed out that the revocation of a certificate did
not prevent one from engaging in the practice, but only deprived
him of the recommendation of public authority.
The state cannot prolibit one, who fails to meet the require-
ments *prescribed for the certified public accountant, from en-
gaging in the practice of accountancy. A quo warianto pro-
ceeding was instituted in State ex ret. Short v. Riddell, et at.,' 8 to
oust the defendants from the exercise of the right of practicing
accountancy without first obtaining a certificate from the state.
The statute prohibited the performance of audits or other serv-
ices of public accountants unless such a certificate were obtained.
The defendants were not accountants for the state or any of its
subdivisions, but served private business. Neither did they pro-
fess to be certified by the state. In holding this statute uncon-
stitutional, the court found that it was a deprivation of private
property; that it "infringed upon matters of contract of purely
1 State v. DeVerges, 95 So. (La.) 805 (1923).
182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789 (1921).
"2208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94 (1922).
13109 Okla. 35, 233 Pac. 684 (1924).
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private concern bearing no perceptible relation to the general
or public welfare";14 and that it tended to create a monopoly
amoung certified public accountants. Unfortunately, this con-
dition can exist independently of statute as a consequence of
arbitrary action by the Boards of Examiners.
In New York the power to confer the certificate of
"C. P. A." is vested in the Board of Regents of the University
of the State of New York.15 This body not only has the power
-of prescribing the qualifications for applicants for the certifi-
cate, but the power to interpret those rules is vested with them.
Davis v. Sextonl' deals with a rule made by the Board of Re-
gents, to the effect that an applicant for the examination must
have been in the employ of a certified public accountant for two
years prior to taking the examination. The applicant in this case
had worked for two years under the supervision of two certified
accountants, who were his fellow employees, for a firm of audi-
tors, none of whom were certified public accountants. The re-
fusal of the application by the Board was upheld.
The fact that one holds a certificate from another jurisdic-
tion does not afford him the right to use the title "Certified
Public Accountant" within a given state. In People v. Mar-
lowe 17 the defendant held a certificate granted by the National
Association of Certified Public Accountants, an organization of
the District of Columbia. The use of the title, "C. P. A., Na-
tional Association", in New York was held to be an infraction
of the statute 8 and a misdemeanor. The rule has been followed
in other states.19
The examining boards may grant certificates in some in-
stances to holders in other states without the requirement of
an examination. This practice exists as a matter of reciprocity
between the states. In the absence of meeting that requirement,
the courts are not prone to compel an examining board to grant
a certificate. In Goldsmith v. Clabaugh,20 the plaintiff, a certi-
fied public accountant in the State of New York, instituted
'4 See infra, note (236).
Is See 80 of General Business Law, L. of 1909, Ch. 25 as amended
by L. 1913, Ch. 443.
16 211 App. Div. 233, 207 N. Y. S. 377 (1925).
'- 40 N. Y. Criminal Rep. 448, 203 N. Y. S. 474 (.1923).
•Supra, note (15).
29Henry v. State, 97 Tex. Criminal Rep. 67, 260 S. W. 190 (1924);
Crow v. State, 97 Tex. Criminal Rep. 98, 260 S. W. 573 (1924).
255 App. . C. 346, 6 F. (2d) 94 (1925).
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mandamus proceedings against the Board of the District of Col-
umbia to compel it to grant a certificate. The statute of the
District of Columbia provided that the Board could grant the
certificate to qualified certificate holders of other states which
granted the same privilege to certificate holders from the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The statute21 of New York extends this priv-
ilege to qualified certificate holders of other states, provided the
applicant has practiced in that jurisdiction for three years. In-
asmuch as the statute of the District of Columbia contained no
prerequisite of practice by the foreign certificate holder, "the
same privilege" was not extended by New York and mandamus
was refused.
The right of the Board of Regents of the University of the
State of New York to confer the certificate has been held to be
an exclusive right.22 The National Association of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants was therefore restrained from giving an exami-
nation in New York.
23
II. LIABILITY TO CLIENT
(1) THE SKIlL REQUIRED IN THE PRACTICE OF THE
PROFESSION.
(a) In General.
Aside from the many generalizations by the court in con-
sidering the liability of public accountants, one court 24 directly
held that they were members of a learned profession. The de-
fendant, a Canadian Bank, opened a branch in New York. It
entered into a contract with an accountant whereby he was to
serve as an assistant in the branch. This action was instituted
under a statute25 prohibiting the importation of contract labor.
The statute contained, among other exemptions, members of a
2Supra, notes (18), (15).
2 The General Business Law, Sec. 80, supra notes (21), (18), (15)
gives them the right to grant the privilege of using the title: "Certified
Public Accountant," and Sec. 66 of educational law gives them the right
to determine what educational institutions can issue diplomas, de-
grees, and certificates.
3Peop~e v. iationa7 Association, 204 App. Div. 288, 197 N. Y. S.
775 (1923).
2 'United States v. Union Bank of 19anada, 262 Fed. 91, 8 A. L. R.
1438 (1919).
-'Compiled St., Sec. 4248, 3 Fed. St. Anno. (2d ed.), p. 264.
L. J-2
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learned profession. A verdict for the defendant was entered
under this section.
Generally every mans in whatever calling, who offers his
services to another, assumes the duty of exercising reasonable
care and skill in the performance of the work. If he offers his
services in a calling that requires peculiar skill, he is understood
as possessing the degree of skill that is common in that particu-
lar calling. If he fails to possess that skill, some 26 have said that
he commits a specie of fraud upon any member of the public
who relies upon his public profession and is damaged. This rule
was followed in Smith v. London Assurance (orporation.27  In
an action for the recovery of fees for services rendered as an
auditor, the court permitted a recovery upon a counterclainm
for negligence. Others28 have stated the same liability in terms
of warranty. That is, a person engaging in a profession that
requires technical skill, impliedly warrants the possession of
such a degree of skill as is necessary for its competent per-
formance.
Many cases have applied the rule to the various professions.
In Lamphier v. Phipos,29 the client of a surgeon was permitted
to recover for negligent treatment, the result of which was the
loss of use of an arm.3 0 Hart v. Frame31 permits recovery against
an attorney; and to the same effect is Fletcher v. Jubb.32 In
the latter, an attorney was instructed to sue a corporation. He
overlooked the expiration of time within which an action could
be brought before it was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The rule is more difficult in application than it is in stating.
0Cooley on Torts, See. 472 (4th ed., 1932), p. 335.
- 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. S. 820.
2BBevin, Negligence in Law (4th ed.), Vol. 2, p. 1321.
22 (1838), 8 C. and P. 475.
81 Tindal, C. J., at p. 479: "Every person who enters a learned pro-
fession undertakes to bring to the exercise of it a reasonable degree
of care and skill. He does not undertake if he is an attorney, that at all
events he will gain your case, nor does a surgeon undertake that he
will perform a cure, nor does he undertake that he will use the highest
possible degree of skill. There may be persons who have a higher edu-
cation and greater advantages than he has, but he undertakes to bring
a fair, reasonable, and competent degree of skill."
816 Cl. and F. 193 (1838). The plaintiff, -a master, employed the
defendant to take proceedings against apprentices for misconduct. The
defendant negligently instituted the proceedings under the wrong sec-
tion of the statute. It was quashed, and the apprentices recovered from
the plaintiff in a cross action.
"122 L. T. R. 258 (1920), 1 X. B. 275.
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What is the skill "common" in the calling? Is it the skill of
a certified public accountant in America I In England, is it the
skill of a "chartered" or "incorporated" accountant? It has
been said 3 that the duties of an accountant and the skill re-
quired in their performance are a matter for legal evidence and
t one for judicial notice. The skill "common" in the pro-
fession might not differ from that required to qualify as a certi-
fied public accountant, a "chartered" or an "incorporated"
accountant. That would be true if the number within these
groups would represent such a proportion of practicing account-
ants that their skill would represent the average of practition-
ers at large.3 4 This test would apply merely to the skill in the
work of accountancy. The -general educational qualifications
which are required by some of the societies are irrelevant. Leeds
Estate, Building and Investment Co., Ltd. v. Shepherd,85 pre-
sents an instance in which the skill exercised was less than the
average. The defendant auditor in this case was a bank clerk
at the time of his appointment. He received only a nominal fee
for the service, and the audit consisted of a most perfunctory
formality,36 which was not sufficient.
Some courts8 7 have said that the duty of an auditor is to
make a reasonable and proper investigation. If, from the ac-
counts and stock sheets, a reasonably prudent man ought to con-
clude something is wrong, it is the duty of the auditor to call it
to the attention of his employer.3 8 Others 9 have stated that it is
the duty of the auditors to examine the books and ascertain that
they are "right", and to prepare a balance sheet showing the
1L. T. 171; 453, May, 1931.
"Bevin, Negligence in Law (4th ed.), Vol. II, p. 1326.
136 Ch. Div. 787 (1887).
" The certificates and correspondence with the management are
evidence of the auditor's inexperience and incompetence. "I certify that
I have examined the above accounts and find them to be a true copy
of those shown in the books of the company." According to this certifi-
cate the auditor was apparently satisfied by a mere mathematical
accuracy and correspondence between the balance sheet and the books
of the company. In a letter to the directors, the auditor suggested that
it would have been better if profits had been accumulated before dis-
tribution of dividends, but acquiesced by saying, "a dividend is no
doubt a necessity:"
Squire Cash Chemists, Ltd. v. Ball, Baker and Co., 106 L. T. 197,
28 T. L. R. 81 (1912).
" Lord Alverstone, in 27 T. L. R. 269.
2Re the Kingston Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., 74 L. T. R. 568; Re
London and General Bank (1895); 2 Ch. 673.
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"true financial position" of the company at the time to which
the balance sheet refers. Auditors are not always accountants.
At least a person does not have to be skilled in the art of book-
keeping to qualify as an auditor, under the many companies
acts of. England. 40 An auditor serving under these circum-
stances may employ an accountant to assist him. This he may do
without the consent of his co-anditor.
41
The rule that one must exercise average skill, or that which
is "common" in the profession does not apply in all circum-
stances. Upon employment the accountant might disclaim any
peculiar skill in the matter, or he might be retained because of a
feeling of friendship upon the part of the client.42 In both of
these instances, the skill that would be required would likely be
less than the average. So too, might it be more. If an account-
ant holds himself out as an expert, or if he is generally known
as such in some particular practice, as bankruptcy or in tax
matters, a greater degree of skill will be required then the aver-
age. One is bound to use that skill and experience which he in
fact possesses. And even in the field of specialists there might
be some variation. 43 If the skill of the "certified", the "char-
tered" and the "incorporated" accountants should not be con-
sidered 4" as the average, but greater than the average, we
should find this latter reasoning to apply. They would then be
considered as "experts" as distinguished from the members of
the profession generally, and within their ranks might be vary-
ing degrees of responsibility according to their specialization in
40 In a rather exceptional case parliament provided that at least one
of the auditors of Building Societies should be "a person who carries
on the business of an accountant." 57-8, Viet., 0. 47, Sec. 3 (1894).
Also it has been assumed that the auditors would not be accountants,
by providing that the auditors could employ accountants to assist
them. 8 and 9 Vict., C. 16, Sec. 108.
laRecovery allowed for part of the fees paid out. Steele v. Sutton
Gas Co., 12 Q. B. 68; 49 L. T. 682.
4 If this be true, "the rule of skill loses its relation to the general
standard of the art and is determined by regard to the particular per,
son." Supra, note (34).
4 Supra, note (34) at p. 1355: In the medical profession the spe-
cialist might be expected to exercise greater skill than the general
practitioner. And there is variation in the field of specialists. "A heart
specialist would be expected to know more about heart matters than
a general consultant." 171 L. T. 453, citing Bowstead's Agency (1924),
Art. 45, p. 123 (7th ed.).
"Supra, note (34).
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the practice. The liability might vary further by reason of stat-
utory or contractual terms under which they are appointed.
Honesty and integrity are fundamental keynotes in judicial
observations upon the responsibility of auditors and accountants.
In Be London and General Bank No. 245 the auditors were cog-
nizant of the worthless character of the receivables (one of the
chief assets of the Bank). They prepared a statement for the
board of directors which recited: "we cannot conclude without
expressing our opinion unhesitatingly that no dividend should
be paid this year". Upon the insistent solicitation of the man-
aging director this statement was altered. before placing it
before the board meeting. In the statement presented to the
shareholders, the defendant auditor's also acquiesced in the re-
quest of the manager to temper their language.4 6 Lind-
ley, L. J., in his opinion expressed the belief that this amount-
ed to a failure to maintain the standard of honesty owing
by the auditors to the shareholders. 41 It thus seems that it is
necessary for the auditor to assume a positive, aggressive atti-
tude in protecting the interests of the shareholders.
(b) Is the Failure to Detect Fraud Negligence?
Should an auditor be suspieious? We have said48 that it
is his duty to make a reasonable and proper investigation. A
proper investigation depends upon the circumstances of the
case. An auditor does not insure absolutely against error in
his work. When there are no circumstances to excite suspicion,
less care would be reasonable than in the case where suspicion
is or ought to have been aroused. 49 To use the metaphors of
Lopes, L. J. :o "An auditor is not bound to be a detective or to
- (1895) 2 Ch. 673.
8 The financial statement was merely qualified: "The value of the
assets shown upon the balance sheet is dependent upon realization."
The report as originally drawn contained this phrase: "and on this
point we have reported specifically to the Board." This last phrase was
only stricken from the report upon the promise of the manager to call
the stockholders' attention thereto in the general meeting.
4T "The main duty of the auditor is that he be honest." And further,
"he must not certify what he does not believe to be true, and he must
take reasonable care and skill before he believes that what he certifies
is true."
48upra, note (37).
1In Re London and General Bankc No. 2 (1895), 2 Ch. 673.
5* Re the Kingston Ootton Mills Co., Ltd., 74 L. T. R. 568, at p. 571.
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approach his work with the foregone conclusion that something
is wrong. He is a watchdog but nof a bloodhound.'' 5 '
Closely allied with the necessity of an auditor approaching
his work iith a suspicious attitude, or "a foregone conclusion
that something is wrong," is the duty of an auditor to detect
fraud. Generally speaking it is necessary to state the true finan-
cial -position of a company by examining the books of account.
Care should be exercised also in ascertaining that this basic data
from which the auditor's report is made is correct. It is diffi-
cult to state the point at which this verification is sufficient. It
is a question of fact to be determined by evidence of what a
reasonable man, e. g., an auditor, would have done under the
circumstances. The courts have had occasion to prescribe bound-
aries upon the question from both sides, which fade away into
the indeterminate realm of factual inquiry. On the one hand
we have seen that an investigation that stops with the ascertain-
ment of the mathematical accuracy and correspondence of books
and balance sheet is not sufficient. 5 2 At the other extreme are
the cases which deny the auditor's liability for failure to detect
fraud. Under the circumstances of these cases, to impose lia-
bility would make the auditor an insurer of his reports in the
absolute sense. This the courts have refused to do. Though
it is the auditor's duty to ascertain that the books and financial
statement present the true position of the company, he does
not guarantee this result. Indeed, he does not guarantee that
his statement is accurate according to the books of the company.
An auditor would not be liable in case he himself had been de-
ceived and had exercised reasonable care. Both of these circum-
stances might occur and still the statement might be inaccurate,
due to the wrongful and fraudulent conceal nent of books from
him. 5
Indeed, where the scheme and mechanism for the execution
of the fraud are elaborate and intricate, the courts have declared
" Lord Alverstone in Mecad v. Ball, 106 L. T. 197 (1912), em-
phasized the necessity of the auditor's conduct being determined by the
circumstances. In commenting upon the language of Lopes, L. J., he
said: "He might have to be a detective in some eases if there are cir-
cumstances to arouse his suspicions as a reasonable man."
52Leed's Estate, Building and Investment Co., Ltd. v. Sh epherd,
8upra, note (35).
,In Re London and General Banke No. 2 (1895), 2 Ch. 673.
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there is no duty of discovery. The "window dressing" prac-
ticed in Re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co." is an example. There
the parties responsible for the defalcations purchased Treasury
Bills to the extent of two hundred thousand pounds, upon mar-
gin, at every accounting period. The presence of this large,
liquid, and safe investment in the portfolios made the loans to
the brokers (which were understated and which led to insol-
vency) seem relatively smaller. There is no duty to discover
all fraud.5 5 Yet if the means of effecting it are so simple that
a reasonable investigation would reveal the fraudulent transac-
tion, the auditor is liable for failing to detect it. This is even
true when, by the contract, the scope of the audit is limited.5 6
In view of this limitation upon the auditor's liability for failing
to discover fraud, it seems that the fears expressed by the court
about extending liability to third parties, who are damaged by
relying upon an audit, were not well founded.5 7 -
(2) DuTY To KNOW LAw AND To GIvE AuvicE UPoN LEGAL
MATTERS.
(a) In Tax Matters.
Is an accountant 'under a legal duty to inform his client of
ways and means of effecting tax exemptions? Need he tell an
unmarried man that if he marries he will enjoy an exemption
in his income tax ? Or tell a married man that if he has children
he will be entitled to further exemptions? Most accountants do
telI and are expected to tell their clients how a tax may be saved.
Aside from the practice, the question of legal duty was recently
raised in the case of Dimmock and Cowtan v. Bayley, Wood, Cave
and Co.58 The plaintiffs were stockbrokers and the defendants
were chartered accountants. The year of 1928 was a very profit-
able one upon the stock exchange, and the following one, 1929,
was equally unprofitable as a consequence of the world-wide finan-
Is 94 L. J. Ch. 445 (1925), Ch. 407, 133 L. T. 520, 40 T. L. R. 853.
Re The Ktngston Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., 74 L. T. R. 568.
"Fox and Son v. Morrlsh, Grant and Co., 35 L. T. R. 126 (1918).
Lawrence, J., expressed sympathy for the defendant: "He was young
at the time and he went on believing that people were honest in a per-
fectly natural way; but he took a risk and the duty which he under-.
took did not entitle him to take that risk."
51 Uultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E.. 441 (1931).
"The Law Times, 171: 453, May, 1931. Heard at Manchester As-
sizes by Commissioner, Mr. H. du Parcq, sitting without a jury.
KETucKY LAw JouRNAL
cial strain and credit retraction. A member of the plaintiff
firm had luncheon, while in London, with a friend who was a
chartered accountant. The latter informed the plaintiff that
by changing the articles of co-partnership and admitting a new
memler, a vast saving could be effected under the Finance Act
of 1926; that by such arrangement the firm would be consid-
ered a new business and the tax would be considerably less.
Upon his return to Manchester, the plaintiff called one of the
defendants, who had charge of plaintiff's tax matters, and asked
him if the saving could be effected. The defendant replied that
he did not think "there was anything to it," but promised that
he would investigate the matter further upon going to London.
This was in October, 1929. In May, 1930, the plaintiff again
saw the chartered accountant of London, who had given him
the information. Plaintiff again mentioned the matter to him,
and upon this occasion he was informed that it was too late; that
the last date for effecting the change was the early part of April,
1930. Upon verification this information proved correct. The
plaintiffs thereupon brought their action under two counts: (a)
contract, failure to obey the instructions of 1929; (b) tort, neg-
ligently failing to be acquainted with the relevant section of the
Finance Act of 1926, and to advise accordingly. Counsel59 for
the plaintiff argued that an accountant who had passed an ex-
amination on the law of income tax should be familiar with the
Act of 1926. Counsel 60 for the defendant answered that a char-
tered accountant is not a lawyer; his duties are those of "'pure
accountancy.', 6 ' It is not the duty of an accountant to inform
his client how a tax might be saved unless he is asked.6 2 It was
the duty of the defendant to make out the returns of the firm
as it then existed, not of a new firm.63 During the course of the
"Mr. Cyril Atkinson, K. C.
Sir Leslie Scott, K. C. M. P.
6The Commissioner: "What is 'pure accounting'?"
62The Commissioner thought that a IVhysician might have to tell
a patient of a discovery in a disease for which the doctor was treating
the patient.
"This last argument might well be criticised because the gist of
the action here was the failure to give advice for saving a tax; not
for failure in making out the returns. In other words, there was no
claim of mathematical or bookkeeping inaccuracy.
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closing arguments the parties compromised by awarding the
plaintiff one-half of the amount clained6 4
In special subjects65 of the law the accountant should and
probably does have a wider range of information than the aver-
age lawyer. Of course he is not expected to be acquainted with
the whole body of the law and all the cases upon the subject.
Within the domains of his special practice, however, he should
be able to find the law applicable to a given question, or incur
liability for failing to secure legal advice from competent
sources.6 6 It has been said that the duty to vounteer advice as
to tax matters depends upon the preliminary contract between
client and accountant and whether the client is taking addi-
tional advice concerning the accounts.6 7
(b) In Corporate Finance.
Do auditors and accountants profess to be experts in cor-
porate finance.? If so, is it necessary that they make themselves
acquainted with the general features of the law and regulation
governing corporate activity? If the answer should be in the
affirmative, it is clear that they would incur liability for failure
to take cognizance of illegal and ultra vires transactions by the
corporation. If the answer should be in the negative, their duty
in the performance of an audit would be fulfilled provided they
set forth, truthfully, the results of the transactions of the cor-
poration, regardless of whether they were illegal or ultra vires.
In Re Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate68 pre-
sented the question.6 9 The cause of the complaint was the irreg-
O'The case therefore does not present a legal precedent in the
strict sense, but it will undoubtedly have its influence as a practical
matter. A like disposition was made of the issue of fraud in the case
of Ultamares v. Touche, supra, note (57).
0Cases interpreting statutes governing bankruptcy and income tax
are examples.
""The obligation of a person professing skill Is to be conversant
with the general principles of the law applicable to his profession and
with the methods of practice of most-ordinary occurrence, even though
knowledge outside the general scope of his profession is involved. A
professional acquaintance of the requirements of the subject are not
required, however." Bevin on iNegUgence, p. 1322.7 Bupra, note (58).
"110 L. T. Rep. 141 (1914), 1 Ch. 139.
"The case dealt solely with the liability of the auditors though the
directors and solicitor were named in the summons. One director con-
fessed judgment; another was dismissed upon plea of privilege under
diplomatic service; the solicitor died.
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ularities of thke clealing between the directors, the solicitor,
and the corporation. Under the law, the company had no power
to deal with the directors. Notwithstanding, the company en-
tered into an agreement with one of the directors whereby he
was empowered to go to Bolivia and take up certain mining
properties. By the terms of the contract no vouchers of the
expenses of the trip were required. The company promotors
also allowed the solicitor a profit for legal services for the or-
ganization. At the time of the organization, the solicitor was
not a director but was subsequently elected. He continued to
serve as counsel after becoming a director and received remuner-
ation for his services. The contract with the director for the
Bolivia expedition was confirmed at the same board meeting at
whish the defendants were appointed. The report of the defend-
ant auditors revealed fully the nature of the above transactions.
However, they did not call to the attention of the shareholders
their illegal character nor the right of the shareholders to con-
test them. The court, though mentioning the question of the
auditor's duty' to know the law,7O gave a decision for the de-
fendant upon the ground that the omission was not the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.
It is submitted that accountants should take cognizance of
the articles of incorporation and the general law of corpora-
tions, so that their reports would correspond with "the reality
in law"7 of the company's financial position.
(3) PnocEmum IN M NING AN AUDIT.
The actual procedure to be followed in making an audit is
a troublesome problem to those who make the audit and the
parties for whom it is made. In 1917 the Federal Trade Com-
mission requested the American Institute of Accountants to
prepare a memorandum upon procedure. After the preparation
of the memorandum approved by the council of the Amer-
ican Institute and the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal
Reserve Board also gave it tentative indorsement and submitted
""Now there are some legal matters which an auditor must ob-
viously know, as there are others which it Is equally obvious he could
not be held responsible for not knowing, and it may not always be
easy to say in what category any particular case falls." Atsbury, T., p.
171.
' Bpra, note (68), in the brief for plaIntiff.
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it to bankers and banking associations throughout the country.
While the procedure is more elaborate than that followed in
the making of a "balance sheet" audit, it has been said that it
is no more than is required for the preparation of statements
of persons and companies seeking credit or loans of cash.
72 Of
course the extent of the verification must lie within the discre-
tion of the auditor making the audit. That discretion cannot
be abused, however. The degree of division of duties and the
internal check afforded by the particular bookkeeping system are
factors for the auditor to consider in determining the verifica-
tion that is necessary.
In all events, it is desirable to prepare after closing trial
balances, both at the beginning and the end of the period. These
should be prepared from the general ledger and stated in "com'-
parative form. All items appearing thereon should be traced to
the balance sheet to insu.re that no "contra" asset or liability,
appearing in the accounts have been omitted from the state-
ment. By omitting a portion of the value reflected in accounts
such as inventory and accounts payable, the books will still
"balance". The omission is of fundamental importance to a
prospective creditor, however. Though the so-called "current
ratio" does not reflect a more favorable position for the exten-
sion of credit by reason of the omission, the result produced by
the "acid test" would. This is true because under the latter
consideration the inventory account is of no importance, while
accounts payable are of great significance.
Newton v. Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.,73 though by
no means a direct authority, recognizes the necessity of stating
all of the assets and liabilities. In this case the Board of Di-
rectors passed a resolution for the creation of a secret reserve
fund. The resolution provided that it would be disclosed to
the auditors but the latter were under a duty not to disclose it
to the share holders.74 Though the articles7 5 of the company
n 'Terification of Financial Statements," submitted by the Federal
Reserve Board, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1929.
(1906) 2 Ch. 378.
"The resolution also provided that the directors could invest the
fund as they saw fit, and that they were not to have any personal lia-
bility as long as it was for the best interest of the company.
15Among other things, they provided: (1) that the directors had
the right to determine the maximum dividend that could be passed;
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gave some color of authority to the directors to pass such a res-
olution, the court granted an injunction restraining action upon
it. The evils of such a practice are readily discernible. The in-
vestments might be of such a character as to involve the com-
pany in loss, or even if they were of such character that the
company's position was shown to be less favorable than it was
in fact, there is still likelihood of harm. The minority holders
might be misled to their detriment. Unfortunately, the court
qualified its opinion to the extent of saying that a secret reserve
was all right unless the auditors thought their statutory duty
required them to reveal it" 6 It was led to do so apparently
because secrecy in investments is necessary due to the trials and
exactions of competition. An auditor who presents a partial
statement of a company's affairs certainly is running the risk
of incurring liability for failure to state the "true position" of
the company.
(a) Cash.
Suppose that an agent of a business, the subject of an audit,
fraudulently pledges accounts receivables, or securities for the
purpose of showing a false cash balance, should the auditor de-
tect the transaction? Or again, suppose that after the auditor
verified the cash balance on hand, a sum was withdrawn and
placed in the cash fund of the business so as to falsify the total
balance of cash, what is the duty of discovery by the auditor?
Good accounting practice ddmands that the cash on hand
should be counted after banking hours on the last day of the
period under audit. It with the amount on deposit in the bank
should be reconciled with the cash records. This verification
should be made upon the same day as a verification is made of
other liquid assets such as investments and. accounts receivables.
This precaution will preclude the possible substitution of funds
received upon a temporary loan to make up a false balance. Ad-
(2) for the creation of a Reserve Fund; (3) the shareholders were only
to have the right of inspection conferred by statute and authorized
by the directors.
7a "It is, I think, competent for the majority of the shareholders
to say that as to particular items of their business it is of interest
to the corporation that there shall be secrecy, and that the auditors
who must for the purpose of the audit know all such details shall not,
unless their duty under the statute requires it, disclose such details to
the members."
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vances to employees should be scrutinized. It is very doubtful
if they should be considered as a part of cash. If the currency
and the check transactions are kept together in one record, and
the cash is not counted until after the close of the period, the
bank balance of the date of the count should be obtained as well
as of the date of closing. Deposits for a short time prior to
closing should be examined to see that they are bona fide de-
posits. The records of the bank should disclose that they were
charged to the account of the drawee. Comparison should be
hade between the deposit slips furnished by banks with debits
of the cash book. This will verify whether or not deposits are
made promptly.
The liquidity of cash, which makes it easy to manipulate
and a temptation for defalcations, justifies this apparently metic-
ulous procedure. The courts have recognized this. Re The
Kingston Cotton Mills, Ltd.,77 distinguished between the care
that was necessary in verification of cash from that which should
be used in the case of inventories. 7s Fox and Son v. Morrish,
Grant and Co.79 illustrates further the strictness with which
the courts have viewed the auditor's duty in this respect. In
this case, the plaintiffs were the owner of two businesses: linen
manufacturers at Leeds and warehousemen in London. The
defendants were Tetained by the plaintiffs to verify their books
and to present half yearly balance sheets. The retainer was ar-
ranged by oral conversation some fifteen years previous to the
time of this litigation. The statements showed a balance of cash
on hand at the London Bank and an overdraft at the Leeds
Bank. The books also revealed that large sums had been drawn
upon the London business in favor of the Leeds business. In
fact these sums were never deposited in favor of the Leeds busi-
ness. If the pass-book of the Leeds bank had been examined, or
a certificate requested from any official bf the Leeds Bank
the defalcations would have been revealed. The defendant
claimed that his only duty was to examine the "postings" of
the books and to prepare a balance sheet. The court held that
" 74 L. T. R. 568.
78 Lindley, L. J., at p. 570: "His position" (employee in charge of
stock) "was not similar to a cashier who has to account for the cash
which he receives, and whose own account of his receipts and pay-
ments could not be reasonably taken by an auditor."
"35 T. L.,R. 126 (1918).
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notwithstanding the arrangement for a limited audit, the de-
fendant was liable for his failure to verify cash. It seems that
the only way that an auditor can be relieved of this duty is by
an express agreement to that effect; or a statement in the bal-
ance sheet that a verification of cash has not been made.
Not only does the proper verification of cash require proof
that all cash receipts and disbursements are made for the use of
the business, but that it has been used in the right way by the




This would be clearly erroneous if $75 represented princi-
pal of the loan and $25 as interest income. Leeds Estate Build-
ing and Investment Co., Ltd. v. Shepherds ° presents the case
where the auditor failed to distinguish between income and
capital, with the consequence of dividends being paid when no
profits were made.8 ' The cash receipts record made no analysis
between income and assets. The loans made by the company
were of long duration, and it was necessary to amortize the
principal in order to obtain the correct allocation between capi-
tal and income.8 2 The court held that the auditors and direc-
tors were guilty of a breach of duty.
(b) Receivables.
What consideration must an auditor give to the receizables,
in the form of promisory notes and book accounts of the trade
customersl Suppose that the par value of the notes was ac-
cepted notwithstanding there were many renewal notes and
others in the hands of attorneys for collection. Would this
amount to a breach of duty? Should receivables of affiliated
companies and officers be segregated upon the statement? A
failure to do so- might lead to various interpretations. Some,
ignorant of the true situation, might interpret the statement as
36 Ch. Div. 787 (1887).
The articles provided for a commission for the directors and a
bonus for the manager In all years in which the income exceeded 5%.
Only in one year did the company make a profit and this was less than
5%. In all others it operated at a loss. Notwithstanding, the company
paid dividends every year amounting to 5% or 10% of capital.
8 The directors claimed that this was a computation involving
actuarial skill and for that reason they should not be liable.
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showing an exceedingly strong current ratio. Others might sup-
pose that it indicated weakness by comparing the ratio between
notes receivables and accounts receivables. How should an
auditor guard against fictitious notes? And so with the ac-
counts receivables, suppose that a large percentage of the "con-
trol" account represents fictitious items. Is the auditor bound
to verify the balances by the subsidiary ledger and supporting
memoranda?
Good accounting practice requires that a schedule of notes
receivables should be made. It should include detailed informa-
tion of the principal, the interest rate, date of execution, and
the maturity dates. If discounted, verification should be ob-
tained from banks discounting. The probable value of renewal
notes and notes in the hands of attorneys for collection should
be considered. Installment sales notes and others maturing
later than one year should be segregated upon the balance sheet.
Likewise, notes of officers and employees and notes arising out
of any transaction other than regular business should be stated
separately. Notes made by affiliated companies, even though
arising out of the course of the business, should be segregated.
If the affiliated company has a good current ratio they might be
stated as current assets, however. The probable negative factor
of notes discounted should be noted. It is desirable to have a
personal acknowledgment. by the maker, communicated directly
to the auditor.
Balances of the accounts receivables should be classified ac-
cording to the age of the accounts. A comparison should be
made with individual customers' accounts appearing in the sub-
sidiary ledgers. The composition of the accounts should be ex-
amined for disputed claims even though they are active, paying
accounts. An estimate should be made of the value of the claim
in dispute. As in the case of notes receivables the accounts
maturing later than one year, and those of employees, and offi-
cers, should be segregated. An appraisal of the reserve for
bad debts should be made. It is necessary to indicate an as-
signment of accounts receivables.
In many respects we find that the law is in accord with the
requirements set forth as the proper accounting practice in the
verification of receivables. The duty of the auditor to take
notice of the value of receivables has been recognized. This was
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t h.e chief deficiency of the report made in Re London and Gen-
eral Bank, No. 283 Though this case was a statutory proceeding,
charging the auditors with misfeasance under the statute,8 4 the
test of duty does not differ materially from that which would
prevail in an action on the case for negligence. 85 The real dif-
ference between the two proceedings is one of form rather than
substantive law. The practical value of the statutory proceed-
ing ia that it is not barred by the Statute of Lfnitations.8 6 The
Bank's chief business in this case was the loaning of money to
about four development companies. Their greatest asset there-
fore consisted of receivables. The loans were valueless and the
auditors were held liable for failing to bring this to the atten-
tion of stockholders in understandable terms. By stating the
nominal rather than the real value of the receivables the balance
shet showed a profit when in fact there was none. Leeds Estate,
Building .and Investment Co. v. Shepherds6a also recognized the
duty of an auditor to consider the value of receivables. In re-
viewing the deficiencies of the system there under consideration,
the court pointed out there was no allowaxce for bad debts,
losses, or contingencies. Of course, this duty to consider the
value of receivables, does not mean that auditors are under a
duty to volunteer advice to the management as to the expe-
diency of certain policies. They are not interested in the mat-
- (1895), 2 Ch. 673.
8442 and 43 Vict. C. 76, Sec. 7; 53 and 54 Vict. C. 63, Sec. 10.
5 See opinion of Stirling, J., in Western Counties Steam Bakeries
and Milling 'Co. (In Re Parsons' and Robjent's Case), 66 L. J. Ch. 354;
(1897) 1 Ch. 617, 76 L. T. 239, at p. 622. (The case was reversed upon
the question of substantive law.) Lopes, L. 3., in Re The Kingston Cot-
ton MilTs, Ltd., 74 L. T. R. 568, seemed to think that the statutory duty,
the breach of which would justify a charge of misfeasance, was more
limited than the legal duty to use ordinary care. Thus at p. 570. he
states: "The learned judge in the court below held that misfeasance
covered any misconduct by an officer of the compauy as such, for which
such officer might have been sued apart from the section. In my judg-
ment this is too wide; it would cover any act of negligence, any action-
able wrong by an officer of the company which did not involve the mis-
application of assets of the company." (Italics are those of the writer.)
Kay, L. 3., however, in the same case spoke of the statutory duty in
the terms of negligence. At p. 572 he said: "If it was the duty of the
auditor to test the statements of the manager in the manner suggested,
or indeed in any manner, they were certainly guilty of negligence, for
they made no attempt whatever to test them. The question is, was it
their duty?" (Italics are those of writer.)
m See the opinion of Stirling, J., supra, note (85).
6A 36 Ch. Div. 787 (1887).
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ters of policy save to the extent that those matters directly
affect the existing financial position of the company.8
7
The duty to segregate, upon the financial statements, re-
ceivables from officers, employees a-Ad affiliated companies, has
incurred more serious obstacles in judicial recognition. The first
cause of complaint in Re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co.88 was the
description, by the auditors, of the debts of the company's man-
ager and brokers as "Loans at call or short notice". This point
the court thought was immaterial, since the directors would not
have investigated the company's status anyway. This conclu-
sion was reached, however, after the court had considered, what
was thought to be the only other alternative description:
"Loans".89 The observation therefore is probably true as far
as it goes. That does not mean that the item should not have
been set forth as "Loans to Officers" or "Loans to Stock-brok-
ers". This, it is submitted, would have put the directors upon
notice. The court also seemed to erroneously apply the limita-
tion of duty to volunteer advice upon expediency of policy,90
which should have no application in this case. Following the
literal language of the opinion of Re London General Bank No.
0: 1 rather than the substance seemed to have facilitated this re-
sult. Since this decision was rendered the duty to segregate re-
ceivables from affiliated companies. has been asserted by the
statutory enactment. 92 The same rule should be applied in the
case of officers and employees.
Auditors and public accountants are under a legal duty
to exercise care in preventing inflation of receivables by includ-
ing fictitious items. In the case of Ultramares v. Touche,
81In Re London and General Bank NVo. 2, supra, note (83): "An
auditor has nothing to do with the prudence or imprudence of making
loans without security. It is nothing to him whether a business Is
being conducted prudently or imprudently, profitably or unprofitably.-
His business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the
company at the time of the audit."
6Supra, note (54).
81 Romer, J., at p. 482.
"Supra, note (87).
n upra, note (83).
919 and 20 Geo. V. C. 23, -Sec. 125: "When any of the assets of a
company consist of shares in or accounts owing (whether on account
of loan or otherwise) from a subsidiary company-the aggregate
amount of those assets, distinguishing shares and indebtedness, shall
be set out in the balance sheet of the first mentioned company sepa-
rately from all its other assets."
Lft. J.--3
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etc,9s this was the basis of falsification. In this business at the
time the audit was made there had been no posting of the gen-
eral ledger for a long period. A junior accountant was as-
signed the task. Upon its completion the amount of accounts
receivables was $644,758.17. Following that total an employee
of the corporation inserted the amount of $706,843. This was
supposed to represent additional accounts receivables growing
out of sales for the month in which the audit was made.94 Op-
posite this last entry there was a posting index. In fact there
was no entry in the journal from which the item had been post-
ed.95 There were sales invoices which supported the amount.
They, were in fact fictitious and had the auditor examined them
their character would have been revealed.906 The court did not
hesitate to say that his procedure would justify a finding of
negligence.
(c) Investments.
Good accounting practice recognizes various circumstances
in the treatment of securities. They. may or may not be current
assets. If funds are temporarily invested, they can be so classi-
fied. If, however, a material equity of another concern is rep-
resented thereby, the interest is fixed and not current. The
interest is to gain and maintain control rather than to receive
dividends or market accretions. If the securities are not readily
marketable they should be stated separately. The auditor
should compile a detailed schedule of those owned. If it ap-
pears that some of the securities have no market value, the bal-
ance sheet of the issuing corporation should be consulted, with
particular attention given to the existence of a surplus or deficit.
Securities in the hands of d transfer agent should be certified
as properly belonging to the subject of the audit. If the total
market value is less than the total book value, a reserve for pos-
sible loss should be established.
As already pointed out, the segregation of securities owned
"255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
This is a tremendous sum, relatively, and prima facie suspicious.
"The index reference: "12-29" was not supported by any entry.
Had the auditor examined the subsidiary ledger his suspicion would,
if a careful man, prompted further inquiry.
16The sales invoices if examined would have confirmed suspicion
because they contained no shipping number or customer's order num-
ber.
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in other affiliated companies has become mandatory by statute
in England. 7 The right of the auditors to rely upon the certifi-
cates of agents holding the company's securities presents a
more troublesome question. It will depend upon various con-
siderations. Was the party with whom the securities were left
a "proper depository"? Was a personal inspection by the
auditor impracticable? The court in Re City Equitable Fire
Ins. Co.08 had occasion to treat of tbis custom. Upon the wind-
ing up of this insurance company there appeared a shortage of
one million two hundred thousand pounds in the funds of the
company. The shortage was due in part to the depreciation of
the securities owned, and in part to the fraudulent conduct of
the managing director. The scheme of the fraud was most
elaborate and as stated above"9 the court held that the auditors
were not liable for failing to discover it from the books of the
company. Romer, J.,100 said that but for the exemptions' 0 1 con-
tained in the company's articles, the defendant auditors would
have been liable, however. This dictum was based upon the fact
that the securities were left with the company's brokers, and it
was represented that they held securities which they did not.
The auditors accepted the certificate of the brokers. The court
stated that except for the brief time in which it was necessary
to leave securities with brokers, the latter were not to be con-
sidered proper depositories. This was true notwithstanding
their reputation for honesty and integrity. If practicable, a per-
sonal inspection of securities, left with one other than a proper
depository, is necessary.' 02
(b) Inventories.
The positive factor in the consideration of credit, the goods
of the trader, affords the auditor difficulties in its examination.
It is of vital importance also. By its misstatement a loss is
readily converted into a gain; a deficit into an adequate equity
of ownership. Strangers to the business, and indeed oftentimes
"Supra, note (92).
8 Supra, note (54).
"Supra, note (54).
"00Ibid., at p. 498.
2" The articles of the company exempted the directors and auditors
for losses except those which were the result of willful neglect.
'3-1Romer, J., supra, note (100).
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the owners tliemselves, have no accurate means of ascertaining
the valuation of large inventories save from the accounting
records. It therefore behooves the auditor to ascertain if those
records present a true story. An examination should have a
three-fold purpose: (a) The ascertainment of quantity. Atten-
tion should be given to the clerical accuracy of the footings, com-
putations, and the recapitulations. Final inventory sheets
should be compared with original memoranda. The amounts
should be certified by those who made the computations and the
auditor should satisfy himself of the competency of those making
the computations. Care should be used to exclude from "work-
in-process" records, items that have been sold and billed out.
Post dated invoices and goods in transit should be ascertained
in order to give special treatment thereto. Goods received on
consignment should be excluded. Those consigned to others
should be 'valued at a price that will make allowance for possi-
ble damage or expense of return. Perhaps the better method
would be to value at cost or market, in the usual fashion, and
establish a reserve to meet these contingencies. (b) The basis
of valuation should be given adequafe consideration. The con-
servative policy, cost or market, whichever is lower, is the
proper one. Though cost should not be written up to market,
attention might be called to the difference in a footnote. An ex-
amination should be made of the cost system to ascertdin the
prices at which "work-in-progress" is included in the inventory.
Selling expenses, interest charges, or administrative expenses
should not be included in factory overhead, so as to reflect in
the value of work-in-process. Duties and transit charges may
properly be added to cost. Machinery and materials that have
been charged to property or plant should not be included, how-
ever. (c) Of equal importance to an accurate statement of in-
ventory value is the consideration of quality and condition of
the goods., Lists of inactive stock should be compiled from
supplies, work-in-process, finished products and purchased
stock in trade. If the company has discontinued the manufac-
ture of any of its products during the year, the inventory should
be scrutinized, and if unsalable, the net amount should be de-
ducted. If the turnover is below the normal rate that fact may
be due to a poor stock of goods. This condition often arises
from an unwillingness to dispose of old and unsalable goods at
LEGAL LIABILITY OP THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
a sacrifice. In general, the accuracy of inventory estimates can
be ascertained by the "gross profits" test. If gross profits have
been fairly constant, and a failure to maintain that constancy
cannot be explained by a rise or a fall in the selling price, the
error is likely due to false stock taking.
The possibilities of abuse afforded by the inventory account
is illustrated by Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Co. v.
Shepherd.0 3  The so-called "stock account" was in reality a
"Loans" account of a bank. Its manipulation in this instance
was characteristic of that which is made with inventories due to
their difficulty of verification. The manager admitted upon trial
of the case that it had been his practice to state all the assets
represented in the business except those of this account, and all
of the liabilities and proprietorship items. After ascertaining
these amounts, he inserted in the "stock account" an amount
that would be sufficient to show whatever profit that was desired
for the year.
Though it is not the duty of an auditor to "take stock", 10 4
he may call for explanations' 0 5 of particular items in the stock-
sheets. The reluctance which the courts have felt in holding
auditors liable for errors arising out of false statements of in-
ventories is illustrated by Squire Cash Chemist, Ltd., v. Ball,
Baker and Co.106 For years the plaintiff had been a mortgagee
creditor of a chemist operating a wholesale house and a chain
of nine retail shops. The proprietor stated that he had a flour-
ishing business, but that it needed more capital. He suggested
that a limited company be formed and that the plaintiff become
a shareholder. The plaintiff had to decide whether he would
collect his loan or invest other money. For the purpose of mak-
ing this decision he employed the defendants, independent audi-
tors, to make an examination of the firm. The plaintiff invested
more money in the company. After a few years it failed, the
debenture holders receiving a nominal amount and the share-
holders and open creditors nothing. Among the claims of neg-
ligence was the failure to verify the stock-sheets. The court
denied the claixq however, because in fact the defendants had
"test checked" the accuracy of stock-sheets with invoices of
"'36 Ch. Div. 787 (1887).
mRe The Kingston Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., 74 L. T. R. 568.
"IComes-Hardy, M. R., infra, note (106).
10106 L. T. 197, 28 T. L. R. 81 (1912).
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purchases. The plaintiff claimed that upon their face the stock-
sheets contained itemsoT that indicated that the auditors should
have taken notice of this fact. The court commented upon the
absence of evidence which would establish this contention. It
did not feel at liberty to take judicial notice of a matter of such
a technical character.10 8 In making an audit an accountant has
a right to rely upon certificates presented by servants of the
company unless he has reason to believe that they are dishon-
est.10 9 The manager of the company, in Re Kingston Cotton
Mills Co., Ltd.,110 had falsely stated the inventories of the
company for a number of years in order to show a profit from
operations. This was during the late "eighties" and early
"nineties" in a time of a business depression. The misstatement
was made in order to make the company appear in a better con-
dition than it was and not for the selfish interest of the wrong-
doer. The auditor accepted the statement of the manager.-"
The business here was the spinning of cotton into yarn. The
amount of the inventory might have been ascertained from the
books of the company. To do so it was necessary to apply this
formula:
1. In. +-P - (S +-W)----F. In.31
Notwithstanding this verification would have revealed the
falsification, the failure to make it was not held to be a breach
of duty. The only justification that the decision has, appar-
ently, is the fact that inventory was stated to be the estimate
of the manager. The discovery of a gross inflation of inventory
should be such a warning as to put an auditor on guard and
"OT The labels of the wholesale shop were carried at four hundred
and seventy-five (475) pounds and of the retail shop at two hundred
and fifty (250) pounds.10s The court comments upon the difficulty of verifying the stock
of a chemist because there are so many small detail items of various
values. Their apparatus is equally difficult to verify both from stand-
point of quantity and value.
"*Lord Alverstone in 27 T.' L. R. 269.
- 74 L. T. R. 568 (1896).
= The auditor qualified his statement by inserting after inventory
item, "as per the certificate of the manager."
n2 The following substitutions should 'be made: I. In.-Initial In-
ventory, composed of both cotton and yarn; P.-Purchases of Coton;
S.-Sales of finished product; W -Waste or shrinkage, estimated at
25% of the raw material processed; F. In.-Final Inventory or the
desired unknown.
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require the exercise of a higher degree of care than would have
to be exercised otherwise. 1 13
(e) Fixed Property and Deferred Charges.
Though fixed property is of little value for short term credit
purposes, it must be examined. In order to present its present
status the auditor must know its original status and the subse-
queit changes. The balance at the beginning of the period,
additions to and deductions from will present the proper value
at a given time. When the authorization fails to specify whether
the expenditure is -an addition, repair, or a replacement, the
physical properties should be examined to ascertain the proper
classification. Additions can only be considered as such when the
object of the expenditure is to increase the.productive capacity
of the plant. Payroll, store, and supply charges to jobs must
be verified from original memoranda. Construction work in
progress and materials for construction work are properly shown.
as fixed assets and' not as inventory items. The purchase of real
estate should be verified by an examination of the title deeds and
the vouchers for payment. Recordation should be verified. If
the company occupies leasehold properties, the leases should be
examined and their terms noted so that improvements on such
properties may be written off during the lease. The difference
in the amount recoverable for insurance upon property prema-
turely put out of use and its recorded value should be written
off. The adequacy of depreciation reserves should be considered.
There are other incidental favorable factors to the extension
of credit that should be considered. .While the so-called deferred
charges to operation might be considered as of minor importance
from the standpoint of a credit inquiry, their estimate and
statement are necessary for' an accurate presentation of the
financial status of the subject of inquiry. Unexpired insurance,
bond discounts applicablM to a future period, and experi-
mental charges are examples of the factors falling within this
category. Aside from the greater accuracy afforded by the
statement of these factors, their consideration affords collateral
information of value. To properly state the item of prepaid
=In Tltramares v. Touche, supra, note (57), the inventory as
given to the auditors was $347,219.08. The defendants discovered errors
in the sum of $303,863.20, which were corrected.
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royalties, the royalty agreement must le examined. That. instru-
ment, interpreted in connection with royalty vouchers will dis-
close the productivity of properties leased by the company. Ex-
perimental charges will afford collateral information as to the
productive policies of the company. Insurance policies may dis-
close the existence of mortgages and liens upon the property
so covered. Unprotected properties should be noted.
(f) Negative Factors.
As the reporter of the credit agency must ascertain the
negative factors that' 13a militate against an affirmative credit
judgment, so too must the auditor verify, those factors. A
schedule of notes payable and bills accepted should be prepared.
The date of execution, maturity date, the name of the payee,
collateral hypothecated, other indorsers, the amount of accrued
interest payable and notations of renewal are informative details
which that schedule should include. A comparison should be
made between this schedule and the special ledgers and the ac-
count of the general ledger that records this data. Statements
of all loans or drafts sold or discounted should be obtained from
the bankers with whom the concern transacts business. Notes
that have been paid should be discharged. A confirmation of
securities hypothecated should be obtained from the pledges.
The suppression of negative factors might just as easily be
an instrument of fraud as the inflation of a positive factor. In
Squire Cash Chemist, Ltd. v. Ball, Baker and Co.114 the failure
to discover the suppression of liabilities was one of
the causes for complaint. It was not allowed by the court
because .the act of suppression amounted to an: act of fraud, the
failure of discovery of which did not amount to negligence. Of
course the decision was directed to the facts before the court
and it does not mean that the failure to discover all fraudulent
suppression of liabilities would be immune to a charge of negli-
gence. Paradoxical as it may sound, the inflation of negative
factors might also be the means of defrauding the client of the
auditor. This is likely to happen only in the case of collusion
between some agent of the company and a third party who is
21 A From the standpoint of making a decision upon the extension of
credit, the financial characteristics of a business might be classified
as affirmative and negative.1"'Supra, note (106).
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apparently a creditor of the company. In Craig v. Anyon"1 5 an
employee of a firm of brokers was dealing in behalf. of one of its
customers. By paying out large sums of money to this customer
when his account showed a balance in favor of the brokers,
the firm was defrauded of a tremendous sum. 116 Though the
court said the failure to discover this defalcation by the auditor
constituted negligence, a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside
for other reasons which will be discussed later.
In Ultramares v. Touche, Etc. 11 the auditors made inquiry
of creditors to ascertain if any securities had been pledged. The
inquiry revealed that the same accounts receivables had been
pledged to two, three, and four banks at the same time. This,
the court said, did not render the assets less valuable but it
should raise doubts as to the solvency of a business that would
indulge in the practice. For this reason the failure to verify
the additional accounts receivables" 8 was all the more reprehen-
sible.
Reasons for disputed claims payable should be ascertained.
It is probably the better practice to show liability for goods
in transit in accounts payable with an opposite entry to inven-
tories. In this case the positive factor is less liquid than the
negative factor. This difference of liquidity makes it of signifi-
cant importance. Care should be exercised to prevent an abuse
of the voucher system. Bills on hand but not vouchered nor
entered in the accounts should be examined. A study of the
minutes of the company might reveal additional liabilities. If
the contract prices are higher than the market price, and the
purchase is not protected by sales, future commitments should
be protected by a reserve for the possible loss. The detection of
liability for goods received and sold upon consignment is often
difficult. Such transactions might be recoriled by memoranda
only. Certificates that all liabilities have been disclosed should
be obtained from the proper officers of the firm. With regard
to legal claims inquiry should be made of the president. He is
usually the proper party upon whom to serve process and for
this reason perhaps the only one apprised of the information.
115 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. S. 259, aff'd without opinion, 242
N. Y. 569, 152 N. E. 431 (1926).
"1 Plaintiffs offered evidence that with one customer alone they had
been defrauded of more than one and one-half million dollars during
the five years in which the defendants perfoimed audits.
'T iSupra, note (57).
nfutpra, notes (93), (94).
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In England auditors who are regularly appointed in fulfill-
ment of statutory requirements, have the right of access to the
books at all times. This provision is intended to protect the au-
ditors in the obligations that they assume. In an opinion
given11 9 to the Institute of Chartered Accountants several years
ago "the books of the company" was construed to mean all of
the books of the company and not merely the books of account.
This would surely include the minutes of the controlling boards
and officers. 120 Cuff v. London County Land and Building
Go.121 seemed to qualify the right of the auditors to the books
of the company when they were desired not for the purpose of
making an audit, but to defeat a threatened suit for negligence.
The directors of the company charged that the company had
suffered severe losses by reason of the negligence of the plaintiff
auditors, and were threatening them with suit. In dismissing
a suit to recover the books of account the court distinguished
between the statutory right of access to the books and the right
of a mandatory decree to enforce the statute. In the absence
of an absolute legal right of access to the books the auditor has
the practical protection of withdrawing from the engagement in
the event his requests are not complied with.
(g) Certificates of Audits.
It is impossible to say the exact form which the certifica-
tion of an audit should take. It is fairly clear, however, that
auditors and public a&countants cannot legally, and should not
desire practically, to relieve themselves of responsibility by
using vague and indefinite language. The use of equivocal
language gains the auditor no immunity. Neither is it sug-
ficient to use an expression which might be understood by those
-who are experts in finance as qualifying a statement, but which
to the laymen is meaningless. The report and audit should use
such language as will render it capable of understanding by
those to whom it is addressed. The statement in Re London
Opinion was given by Haldane, Q. C. M. P., and Eady, Q. C.
45 Solicitor's Journal, 167 (1901).
81 L. J. Ch. 426 (1912), 1 Ch. 440, 106 L. T. 285, 28 T. L. R. 218.
The manager had defrauded the company by embezzling Its cash and
showing the amount taken as an accrued asset, e. g., rentals in ar-
rears.
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anLd General Bank No. 2122 contained this qualification: "The
value of the assets shown upon the Balance Sheet is dependent
upon realization." This the court said amounted to duplicity
upon the part of the auditors. Their duty to the shareholders
was not satisfied by the mere statement of a half truth.
23 Of
course the objection can quite intelligently be made that the pub-
lic circulation of doubtful reports might needlessly bring ruin
upon the company. It is not necessary to give wide publicity
to such a report, however. A confidential report might be ad-
dressed to the interested parties, which informs them where the
full information can be obtained. 24 If the language used in
the report clearly indicates that the information is gained from
an unverified source, the auditors are not responsible for its
falsity.
12 5
We thus see that it is the duty of the auditor to: (1) Ascer-
tain that all of the positive factors, shown by the books of ac-
count actually existed; (2) Establish that no positive factor
that should be considered was omitted from the book records;
(3) Establish that all negative factors were in fact shown; (4)
Establish that all apparent negative factors were the result of
properly authorized transactions.1 25 a With, respect to the last
consideration, a similar observation might be made in connec-




Tte test of what is the proximate cause of an event is not
easy to state. In case of negligence of an accountant or an
auditor the question might well be asked: Does the misconduct,
undisturbed by any independent cause, produce the injury?
Some jurisdictions have held that proximate cause is deter-
=Supra, note (45).
"A person whose duty it is to convey information to others does
not discharge that duty by simply giving them so much information
as Is calculated, to induce them or some of them to ask for more."
The qualification here used might incite inquiry among the account-
ing profession but to the layman it was nothing more than a meaning-
less truism.
121Supra, notes (122), (45).
"Btupra, note (111).
L^ "Auditing Theory and Practice," Montgomery.
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mined by whether or not the injury complained of could have
been reasonably foreseen as a probable consequence of the act
of negligence. 12 6 But the same jurisdictions have declared that
negligence is the proximate cause of an injury that follows in
an unbrol.en sequence from the act, though the specific result
would seem improbable at the time of doing the acf.127
Would a balance sheet, faultily prepared by auditors, and
presented by them to directors be a direct cause of injury to a
company if the directors recommended the payment of a divi-
dend and this recommendation was acted upon by share-
holders ? Here it might be plausible to argue that there was
an intervening agency; the recommendation of the directors.
This was the argument presented in Re London and General
Bank, No. _.12s It is not hard to sustain the court's denial129
of the contention. Applying the rule of foreseeability, the only
purpose of the audit was to ascertain whether the position of
the company warranted the declaration of a dividend. The
declaration of the dividend, as a consequence of the erroneous
balance sheet, therefore, could hardly be designated an unex-
pected event. The same result might be reached under the test
of the directness of the sequence of the events, 130 by looking
upon the balance sheet as a continuing representation. 13' In
Be Republic of Bolivia Exploraiwn Syndicate3 2 presents a case
in which the negligence of the auditors was not the proximate
cause of the injury. The cause of the complaint here was the
failure to instruct the shareholders that certain promotion
Cooley on Torts (4th ed.), Sec. 53 (1932), citing South-Side
Passenger Ry. Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa. St. 390, 11 At. 627, 2 Am. St. Rep.
672.
1 Ibid., citing Bunting v. Hogset, 139 Pa. St: 363, 21 At. 31, 12
L. R. A. 268, 23 Am. St. Rep. 192, in which the impact of two locomo-
tives opened the steam valve of the one driven by the negligent engi-
neer, and caused it to complete the circle of a switch, causing a second
collision and injury to plaintiff. See also Bohlen, "Studies in the Law
of Torts," 0. 1.
128Supra, note (45).
12 "The balance sheet and the account certified by the auditors,
showing a profit available for a dividend, were in my judgment, not
the remote, but the real operating cause of the resolution for the pay-
ment of the dividend, which the directors improperly recommended."
"Supra, note (127).
"'Rigby, L. J., at p. 697: "The report of the auditors was a con-
tinuing representation made indeed before, but in law and in good
sense to be treated as repeated after the recommendation of the di-
rectors."
"2 110 L. T. Rep. 141 (1914), 1 Oh. 139.
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charges were improper. At the stockholders' meeting, some of
the shareholders challenged the payment of some of these items.
The defendant auditor told them that they could approve the
charges or not, as they saw fit. Thereupon the meeting ad-
journed for the purpose of discussing and considering the ques-
tion. Upon reconvening the charges were approved. Squire
Cash Chemist, Ltd. v. Ball, Baker and Co. 1 3 seems harder to
justify upon this ground. The plaintiff was not satisfied with
the statement presented by the company's auditors in this case
and therefore employed the, defendants to make an audit. Fol-
lowing that audit he made further investments instead of col-
lecting an existing loan. In spite of these facts, the court of
appeal was not willing to say that the negligent audit was the
proximate cause of the injury.'
34
(b) Contributory Negligence.
If we recognize fault as a test of right, in the law, the
defense of contributory negligence follows as a logical con-
sequence. By this criterion a man should not be permitted to
base a right of recovery upon his own fault.' 35 Practically,
however, it is a difficult defense to establish upon behalf of
auditors because of the matter of proof. The great majority of
people who rely upon the work of an accountant do so almost
in blind faith. The work is so foreign to their understanding
that they are not in a position to say whether it has been done
properly or not. 136 Some have expressed doubts as to whether
courts have recognized that imposing liability for negligent
statements was not the extension of the law of intentional wrong-
doing but of negligent conduct. 137 If they failed to realize
Supra, note (106).
131 Cozen-Hardy, M. R.: Is it a necessary implication that if the de-
fendant had done their duty as accountants, the plaintiff would not
have invested his money? I am unable to draw that inference." The
court questioned the sufficiency of the proof as the matter was properly
alleged. It is difficult to understand what proof would have satisfied
the court as the facts we have stated appeared in the testimony of the
plaintiff.
15Rathburn and West v. Payne, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 399.
21 Taylor, C. at p. 209 of 45 L. R. A. (N. S.): "The work of an ex-
pert accountant is of such a technical character and requires such
peculiar skill, that the ordinary person cannot be expected to know
whether he performs his duties properly or otherwise, but must rely
upon his report as to the thoroughness and accuracy of his work."
'i "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty," Bohlen,
42 Harvard Law Review, 733, at p. 737, Part L
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that distinction, it is quite probable in those jurisdictions that
contributory negligence would not be available as a defense. It
is the modern tendency to deny contributory negligence as a
defense in an action for fraud.1 38 Though it has been said'8 9
that no case intimated that contributory negligence would be
a defense for a purely negligent misrepresentation, it is sub-
mitted that New York 40 has applied the doctrine' 41 in the case
of Craig v. Anyon 142 It is true that the negligence of plaintiff
in this case did not consist in the failure to examine the state-
ments presented. From the facts it appearad that the plaintiffs
were stockbrokers and that they had retained the defendants to
make an audit and submit a report periodically. There had been
defalcations 43 extending over a five-year period. This action
was based upon the negligent performance of the audit. It was
found by the jury, and the appellate division on review con-
curred, that had the auditors performed their work properly
the error would have been discovered.' 4 4 The court took the
unusual position that inasmuch as the plaintiffs had permitted
the defaulting employee to carry out his scheme uninterrupted
and unsupervised that they were guilty of contributory negli-
gence and therefore the special verdict for plaintiff should be
set aside.' 45 In doing so it cited and quoted in Be Kingstoz
288 Crompton v. Beedle, 83 Vt. 287, 75 Atl. 331, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)
748.
" Supra, note (137): "While the question has not been definitely
presented for judicial decision, it Is strange that no case contains any
intimation to the effect that where the misstatement is merely negli-
gent the plaintiff may be barred from recovery by a failure to utilize
obvious means of checking up its accuracy, although his failure to do
so would not bar his recovery were the misstatement intentionally and
consciously misleading." At p. 740.
o14 This Is one of the few jurisdictions that recognize negligent mis-
statements as such. Supra, note (137), p. 737(n).
' There was nothing in the case that would contrast fraud and
negligence and the non-applicability of defense of contributory negli-
gence to the former, however.
'a 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. S. 259; aff'd 242 N. Y. 569, 152 N. E.
431 (1926).
1W gupra, note (116)
1" Two questions were submitted to a jury for a special verdict.
They were: (1) "Were the defendants guilty in the performance of
their agreement with Craig and Co.?" (2) "If so what damages re-
sulted directly and proximately from such negligence?" The jury an-
swered .the first, "Yes," and the second, "$1,177,805.26."
15 The court did permit the recovery of two thousand dollars, the
amount, of compensation paid for defendants' services. See, infra, the
discussion of damages.
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Cotton Mills, Ltd. 4 6 which stated that an auditor had a right
to rely upon the summaries and certificates of employees of the*
business under audit. This result has been criticised 147 upon
two grounds. The first waq the distinction between Craig v.
Anyon148 and in Re Kingston Cotton Mills.149 The distinction
was said to be that in the latter there was no means of an in-
dependent verification, whereas in the former there was such an
opportunity.15o This distinction apparently does not exist.15 '
The second basis of the criticism seems well founded. In per-
mitting the defense of contributory negligence upon the facts
in this case the court is certainly going contrary to the realities
of modern: business. It is a matter of common knowledge that
the only way in which our modern business can be carried on
is through the legal device of agency. Modern business is so
complex, covers so many detailed transactions and extends over
such a wide area of space that it would be impossible to accom-
plish satisfactory results save by permitting the entrepreneur to
extend his personality and multiply his activity through agents.
It is equally clear that it is impossible for the entrepreneur to
verify the fidelity of these agents. For this reason the account-
ing profession has come into existence. It therefore seems
absurd to say that unless the business man performs the func-
tion which he employs the accountant to perform, he cannot
recover from the accountant for misfeasance. If the rule in this
case were logically carried out, there would remain little utility
in the services of the public accountant.
Some have argued that, logically, the rule of contributory
negligence has no place in an action for injury resulting from
the malpractice of a professional service. The treatment of the
case as sounding in tort for negligent injury is a survival of the
ancient action of misfeasance. 152 If the action were founded
upon a breach of contract, the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence would not prevail. The only obligation of the client in
" Supra, note (110).
1" "The Legal Responsibility of Public Accountants," 35 Yale
Law Journal 76.
1 18 upra, notes (142), (115).
2,, Supra, note (110).
10Bupra, note (147), p. 82, note (20).
1n Supra, note (112).
10 Supra, note (147) citing Ames, Lectures on Legal History, p.
129, et. seq.
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this, instance would be to mitigate damages after notice of
breach.'" 3 It is hard to see in the light of many cases why the
duty of the accountant to the client should not rest either upon
contract or a tort arising out of the faulty performance of the
contract. Though it has been said' 54 that the modern tendency
of the law does not favor the extension of the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, there is a field within which it does and
should apply. If the circumstances warrant it the defense may
well be applied to actions against public accountants. It is be-
lieved, however, that those occasions will be very rare.'5"
(5) MEASURE OF DAVAGES.
Finding that an accountant has conducted an audit in an
improper fashion and that no legal defense could be asserted
thereto, what principles should determine the assessment of dam-
ages for the wrong? Should the element of damages be confined
to the natural consequences of the act complained of? The
answer to the question should depend upon whether the cause
of the injury is considered as a breach of contract or a tort for
negligence. In the latter, for the purpose of determining
whether there is a cause of action the injury complained of
must be both the natural and proximate result of the wrongful
act. For the purpose of determining damages once the cause
of action has been established, the proximate result of the tort
is the test, regardless of whether it is the natural result. But
in the case of contract, in ascertaining the elements of damage,
the injury must be the natural consequences of the breach, or
it must be within the actual or potential contemplation of the
parties at the time the obligation was assumed.15 6
East Grand Forks v. Steele,157 treated of the question of
the measurement of damages for the negligent performance of
an audit. The defendants were employed to audit the books of
a city clerk. He was charged, in addition to his regular duties,
with the collection of money due the city for electric lights,
water, sewer assessments and license fees. For the honest per-
3Supra, note (147), p. 80.
5 "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty," Bohlen,
supra, note (137).
153upra, note (136).
"Sedgwick on Damages, Section 142.
'T121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205 (1913).
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formance of these duties he had given bond. The defendants
audited the books for two successive years and upon both oc-
casions reported that the accounts were accurate. In fact, the
clerk was in default upon both occasions.158 The audit was neg-
ligently made. 59 At the time of the first audit the clerk's
surety was solvent and.had the defalcation been discovered the
city would have been saved, harmless. The city sued to recover:
(1) the amount of the defalcation; (2) the fees paid the ac-
countants. A demurrer was sustained as to the first count and
overruled as to the second. The court, in applying the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, e0o stated that in the absence of special cir-
cumstances known to the accountants from which they ought to
have inferred that such losses were likely to result, the subse-
quent defalcation of the city clerk and insolvency of his surety
could be considered as neither the natural or proximate con-
sequence of the negligent audit. Craig v. Anyonl s l follows this
rule as to the measure of damages.'0 2 It therefore presents the
unusual situation of permitting the defense of contributory
negligence upon the theory that the action sounded in tort and
at the same time following a case thai was based upon breach
,of contract for the purpose of measuring damages. There is
no reason why auditors should not be liable for the amount of
the defalcations that follow as a consequence of their negligence.
Their duty in many cases has been stated in terms of tort. 3 3
A3 stated above,' 64 under that theory they should be liable for
u8At the end of the first year the accounts were deficient in the
amount of $1,984.26 and at the end of the second year in the amount of
$5,339.
"A conclusion of the court based upon the allegations of the com-
plaint, to which a demurrer was filed, that the defalcations were
readily discovered by the state examiners.
16 9 Ex. 341, 23 L. 3. Ex. 179. This is the leading case upon the
measurement of damages for breach of contract. Plaintiffs were owners
of a steam mill. The shaft in the mill was broken and they gave it to
the defendants, a carrier, to take to an engineer. The latter was to use
it for a model. The defendant delayed .in the delivery and the plaintiff
attempted to recover loss of profits from the cessation of the operation
of the mill. As the defendant did not know the absence of the shaft was
the sole cause of the cessation of operation, plaintiff could not recover
for loss of profits.




2 Supra, note (145).
2 3Fox and Son v. Morrish, Grant and Co., 35 T. L. R. 126 (1918);
Bmith v. London Assurance Corporation, 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. S.
820 (1905).
1 0 Supra, note (156).
L. J.-4
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all injuries that are the proximate result of, their misfeasance.
Smith v. London Assurance Corporation'65 did permit recovery
of the amount of the embezzlement that resulted subsequent to
their faulty audit. They should not be held liable for losses
which were occasioned by defalcations prior to their employ-
ment, however.
Accepting the theory of the case of East Grand Forks v.
Steele,'66 there is apparently no reason why the auditors might
not in the proper case be held liable for the amount which the
client has lost by reason of their failure to perform their duty.
The suggestion' 67 that parties at the time of making a contract
do not anticipate its breach seems a rational one. The test of
whether a particular injury falls within that contemplated by
the parties should not be limited to their actual contemplation
but to the possible, natural or normal contemplation in view of
all the circumstances attending the making of the agreement.
The prevention of future losses by the discovery of any existing
defalcation is certainly within the possible contemplation of
auditor and client at t.e time that relationship is assumed. It
is quite properly a question of fact. It is hard to see how a
court could properly set aside a finding to that effect in the
absence of evidence that the purpose of the audit was only to
ascertain the then existing financial condition of the business.
III. LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES.
.What is the liability of the public accountant to the busi-
ness man with whom he has no relation? Is he liable to him for
the negligent performance of an audit? If so, does liability
extend in all cases or only in the case in which the courts find
that there is a "duty" owing by the accountant? If the latter
is necessary, what is sufficient to raise that "duty"? Are there
any other theories under which an accountant might be made
liable? These and many other questions must be answered in
dealing with this troublesome problem. It is a novel question
in the majority of jurisdictions. Those that have treated of it
have done so with a lack of unanimity of opinion.168
tupra, note (163).
6 Supra, note (157).
28, Wilson v. Newport Dock Co., L. R. 1 Ex. 177.
10 In Ultramares v. Touche, supra, note (93), there were two
counts: the first for the negligent misrepresentation and the second
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(1) NEGLIGENcE.
In the field of torts legal liability may be stated in terms
of misrepresentations. The character of the conduct that pro-
duces a misrepresentation will determine the legal liability of
the actor. It may be physical conduct, or spoken language; in-
tentional, dishonest, or careless and unintentional. Depending
upon these attributes we are accustomed to think of it in terms
of negligence, deceit, and fraud. Misrepresentations that lead a
party into unsuccessful economic ventures and result in a dim-
inution of one's financial estate customarily give rise to a
legal cause of action for deceit. On the other hand, those that
result in physical injury and which, are brought about by phys-
ical conduct rather than language may give rise to a legal action
for negligence. In this latter instance the law is more liberal in
according redress for the injury that has been caused.1 69
Does, and should, the law give redress for a negligent mis-
representation by language which results merely in the diminu-
tion of one's financial estate? The great case of Derry v.
Peek 70 raised the query by way of dictum. The Court of
Appeals 17 1 answered it in the affirmative; the House of Lords
in the negative. 172 This is essentially the problem raised when
an accountant issues a negligently prepared statement to a client
for the fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial judge dismissed the
cause for fraud and submitted the issue for negligence. The jury found
for the plaintiff, and the trial court then granted the reserved motion
to dismiss. The appellate division affirmed the dismissal upon the
issue of fraud, but reversed the dismissal for negligence. The Court
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division upon both issues, holding
that the issue of fraud should be submitted and that of negligence dis-
missed.. We thus find the cause argued before three tribunals, all of
which were of a different opinion upon the law of the case.
21 Misrepresentations as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, Francis
Bohlen, 42 Harvard Law Review 733 (1929).
-0°37 Ch. D. 541 (1885), 14 A. C. 337 (1889). The defendants stated
in a prospectus that a tramway to be constructed had a franchise to
use steam power. The act granting the 'right made the permiision of
the Board of Trade a condiiton precedent to the right to use steam
power. The prospectus was issued by the defendants, believing that
there would be no difficulty in securing the permission. They failed
to secure the right and upon the failure of the company, the plaintiff
brought an action for deceit.
1 The Court of Appeals reasoned that if the statements made were
false, known to be such, or without reasonable grounds to believe that
they were true, then the plaintiff could recover. (Italics are those of
the writer.)
=2 The House of Lords reasoned that in order to maintain deceit
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and a stranger is injured by relying upon it. There
have been but two cases in which the question was raised. The
first was that of LandeZl v. Lybrand.173  The plaintiff purchased
stock in a corporation upon the faith of a certificate shown him
by a third party. The stock was worthless. He brought an
action against the accountants for negligently auditing the books
of the company. In a brief opinion the court awarded a judg-
ment for the defendants. In effect it reached the conclusion
that there was no "duty" owing to the plaintiff inasmuch as he
and the party who presented the certificate to him were strangers
to the defendant. The issue of negligence was dismissed for a
similar reason in Ultramares v. Touche.174 The latter should be
distinguished from LandeZl v. Lybrand,17" however. There the
defendants made an audit and prepared thirty-two duplicate
copies of their report and balance sheet. They knew that the
client would use these copies as an instrumentality for receiving
credit. The balance sheet showed a net worth of over a million
dollars, when in fact the corporation was insolvent. The plain-
tiff, before extending credit, demanded a financial statement.
That which had been prepared by the defendant was presented.
The plaintiff relied upon it to his detriment. The court rea-
soned that the plaintiff could not be considered as a party to the
contract between the client and the auditor. In this decision it
made tort "duty" coterminous with the "privity" of that con-
tract. The clear logic of the opinion certainly is not open to
criticism. Reading the opinion as a whole, however, one cannot
but believe that the court was more troubled with the practical
consequences of imposing liability than with the logical difficul-
ties of precedent.1Y6 The fears expressed upon the practical
consequences of such a holding would not result from the mere
imposition of liability for negligence.177 In order to reach lfhe
it was necessary to show fraud. A statement honestly made was not
fraudulent even though there was no reasonable grounds for making it.
3264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919).
"4 Supra, notes (93), (168).
175 Oupra, note (173).
218 "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminant
amount, for an indeterminant time, to an indeterminant class." Car-
dozo,. J., at p. 444 of 174 N. E. 441.
'" See II (b). "Is the Failure to Detect Fraud Negligence?" Supra,
note .(57).
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results anticipated by the court, liability for negligence would
have to be extended into liability as an insurer.
(a) What Relationship is Necessary to Justify
the Conciusion that There is Privity
Between the Parties?
The foregoing cases cannot be accepted as holding that ac-
countants are not liable to strangers for negligence under any
circumstances. If tort duty is accepted as coterminous with
contractual privity, it is interesting to note that many times a
party other than those that perfect the bargain may enforce
rights that accrue under it. A promise made for the benefit of
a creditor of the promisee,17 8 or for the benefit of the wife,
179
or the child,1 80 of the promisee is enforceable. The same is true
of some promises made for the benefit of citizens of a municipal-
ity.181 So too, if at the request of a party to a contract, the
promise runs directly to the beneficiary, the latter may recover
although he does not furnish the consideration.' 2 Though ob-
jection might be raised to the foregoing cases because they
sounded in contract rather than tort,183 there have been cases in
New Y6rk that approach very nearly the situation here dis-
-cussed. In Glazner v. Shephardcs' liability was predicated upon
tort liability for negligently issuing a weigher's certificate. The
defendant was a public weigher and was engaged and paid by
the seller. He knew that the purpose of the weighing was to
ascertain the amount which the plaintiff, the purchaser, should
pay. By reason of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff paid
an excessive amount for the goods. He was permitted to reco-ier
1 8Lawrence v. Fox., 20 N. Y. 268.
V' Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109, 52 N. E. 724, 44 L R. A. 170,
70 Am. St. Rep. 454.
Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181.
' Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 345 (b). A contract
with a city that streets will be kept in repair is enforceable by a
member of public because the city is under a duty to the public to keep
them in repair.
'1In Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918), a tes-
tatrix in extremis, signed a will upon the promise of her husband to
make provision for a favorite niece. The husband died without having
made provision for the niece and she was permitted to recover against
the estate of the promisor.
'13As previously stated in the text at note (175), et seq., the lia-
bility is co-extensive, however.
Is, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
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back the amount of the overpayment. The court emphasized
that here the defendant was made liable not merely for careless
words but for the careless performance of a physical act.185
This is not a persuasive distinction from Ultramares v.
Touche'86 however. In the latter it might well be pointed out
that the accountants were guilty of the negligent omission of a
physical act, e. g., the series of physical acts that would be nec-
essary for an examiliation of the subsidiary ledgers and sup-
porting memoranda.18" The real distinction seems to be that
in the Glanzer case the certificate was addressed to the pur-
chaser. The requirements of privity within the meaning of third
party beneficiary contracts 8 is thus present, whereas in the
Ultramares case it is not. This would seem to justify the con-
clusion that the Glanzer case is still law. It also seems more
helpful and of more substance than that founded upon "pri-
mary" and "incidental" beneficiaries of the contract for the
performance of the audit.' 8 9 In other words the facts that
justify the conclusion as to whether a particular party is an
incidental or primary beneficiary are more important than the
conclusion itself.
International Products Co. v. Erie Ry. Co.190 also presents
facts which bring it within the rule of the Glanzer case. The
gist of the action here was the negligent designation of a place
of storage of goods imported by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
relied upon that designation and gave it in the description of
the- goods for purpose of effecting insurance. Upon the destruc-
tion of the goods and the failure of the insurance to attach, re-
covery -was permitted against the carrier. The court expressly
It has been said that the recovery in Glanzer v. Shephard should
not be justified solely upon the negligent physical omission of the,
weigher. "But recovery should not be denied simply because the
physical act is missing and there is substituted a mental service or
act negligently performed which similarly finds culmination in the
words of a certificate or prospectus." The result of Glanzer v. Shepharc
was here approved. 36 Harvard Law Review 114.
"'Zupra, notes (168), (93).
21upra, notes (95), (96).
2888upra, note (182).
"I Oardozo in distinguishing Glanzer v. Shephard, said: "Here was
a case where the transmission of the certificate to another was not
merely one possibility among many but the end and aim of the trans-
action, -as certain and deliberately willed as if a husband were to order-
a gown to be delivered to his wife . ...
"'244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927).
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placed the decision upon the ground of negligence. In doing so
it recognized that the English law had denied a right of re-
covery under these circumstances.1 9 :
Boyle v. Chatham Pheniz NationaZ Bank,192 both upon the
facts and the language used in the opinion, presents a more dif-
ficult case to distinguish from Ultramares v. Touche. 93 The
defendants here were held liable for negligently certifying that
collateral had been deposited to secure a bond issue. The issue
was actually a swindle. All of the collateral was worthless. The
following elements were said to be necessary to render one lia-
ble for negligent language :'94 (1) The author of the statement
must have knowledge that it is required for a serious purpose;
(2) he must have knowledge that those for whom it is made
intend to act and rely upon it; (3) he must know that if it is
false they may be damaged; and (4) the relationship of the
parties arising out of .contract or otherwise, must be such that
there is a duty to give the information with care. It is true that
the plaintiff here belonged to a determined class-prospective
purchasers of bonds. There was also created by the act of pur-
chase a fiduciary relationship. But at the time of the certifica-
tion there was no more relationship between the trustee and
cestui than there was between the accountant and the creditor
in the Ultramares case.
Jaillet v. Cashmran,'9 5 and Courteen Seed Co. v. Banking
Cforporation'9" present restrictions upon the doctrine of neg-
ligent misstatements. The former was an action for the neg-
ligent transmission of information by a ticker service. A
customer of the broker, acting in response thereto, was dam-
aged. He sougbit recovery against the service. It was denied.
The case may be distinguished from the usual negligent
language action upon the nature of the service rendered. Like
a newspaper, the speed with which the information is dis-
2f Citing Pollock on Torts (12 ed.), p. 565; a dictum of Derry v.
Peek, L. R. 14 A. C. 337: "No cause of action is maintainable for a
mere statement although untrue, and although acted upon to the dam-
age of the person to whom the statement is made unless the statement
be false to the knbwledge of the party making it."
192253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574.
'OSupra, notes (186), (168), (93).
2 Citing Andrews, J., in InternationaZ Products Co. v. Erie Ry. Co.,
Supra, note (190).
235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714.
S245 N. Y. 377, 157 N. E. 272, 56 A. L. R. 1186.
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seminated is its chief utility. Probable error in its accuracy
then should be contemplated. The latter may also be dis-
tinguished upon the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence.
1 97
In Englaiid, at one time, it was held that there was liability
for negligent statements in the absence of contractual duty.
In Cann v. Wilson' 98 a mortgagor applied to the defendant, an
expert valuer, for an appraisal upon property that was to be
mortgaged. The defendant sent the valuation directly to the
solicitors of the mortgagee. Upon default, the property was
not sufficient to cover the amount of the loan. From the evi-
dence it appeared th~at the defendant knew the intended use of
the valuation. The plaintiff was permitted to reecover. This
case was overruled1 9 9 by Le Lievre v. Gould.200  The attempt
to extend liability for financial injury resulting from negligence,
in the absence of privity between the parties, failed.20 1 Robert-
son v. Fleming20 2 presented some rather fine distinctions upon
the obligation of a lawyer to parties who were not his clients.
They were dependent upon the doctrine of privity as the term
is understood in the interpretation of "third-party beneficiary"
contracts. 20
3
If contractual duty is established the rule founded upon
the dictum of Derry v. Peek20 4 does not apply. In Pritty v.
Child20 5 the plaintiff employed the defendant, a professional
water finder, to locate a well. A spot was designated upon
which it was said that water might be found at a depth of thirty
16 Cornell Law Quarterly 419, at p. 422.
' 57 L. J. Ch. 1034, 39 Ch. D. 39, 59 L. T. 723.
2 "No doubt if Cann v. Wilson," supra, note (198), "stood as good
law, it would cover the present case. But I do not hesitate to say that
Cann v. Wilson is not now law. Chitty, J., in deciding that case acted
upon an erroneous proposition of law which has since been overruled
by Derry v. Peek." Supra, note (170), per Lord Esher.
262 L. J. Q. B. 353 (1893), 1 Q. B. 491.
=See 40 Yale Law Journal 128.
204 Macq. H. L. 167, 1 Paterson 1053 (1861).
211 The obligor of leasehold properties undertook to indemnify his
sureties thereunder by an assignment of certain leasehold properties.
The obligor employed the defendant to perfect the transaction. By
reason of the failure to notify the landlord the security was lost. The
court intimated that the lawyer would be liable to the sureties as he
knew he was the only lawyer employed in the case. By way of dictum
the court denied, however, that a disappointed legatee would have any
right against a solicitor who had drawn a defective will.
Supra, note (191).
71 L. J. K. B. 512, 18 T. L. R. 460 (1902).
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feet. The plaintiff drilled beyond that depth and failed to
reach water. Recovery was permitted.206 Sometimes the same
result is reached by estoppel.
20 7
This doctrine upon which the decision of Ultramares v.
Touche208 was based has been applied in a great many cases
involving the negligent issue of certificates. Saving Bank v.
Ward200 is the leading case upon title abstracter's liability. In
this case the borrower of money employed the defendant to
examine his title to property. The latter certified that the
former's title was "good and unencumbered". The plaintiff,
upon the faith of the certificate, accepted a mortgage of the lot.
At the time the defendant issued the certificate the mortgagor
had conveyed the property in fee. This conveyance was also
a matter of record. 210 Thomas v. Guarantee Title and Trust
Co.211 followed Savings Bank v. Ward.212  In this opinion we
find the doctrine of caveat emptor applying with its fullest vigor.
Like the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence
213
between accountant and client, this rule overlooks the necessity
of division of labor under capitalistic production.
' Lord Alverstone hinted that if the trial judge had not found that
the statement was one of fact, he would be induced to dismiss the peti-
tion because the statement was an expression of an opinion. Query:
May one not rely upon the expression of opinion under some circum-
stances? One who is not an expert may rely upon expert opinion.
"Liability for Non-Defamatory Statements," 47 South African Law
Journal 359, citing Rifwards v. Lamb, 67 N. H. 597, 45 Atl. 480 (1899).
In this case a physician was held liable for negligently expressing an
opinion that plaintiff could dress an infection without danger.
-In Compania, Naviera Vasconzoda v. Churchill and Sin (1906),
1 K. B. 237, the plaintiffs relied upon statements in the bill of lading
that the goods were in good condition when shipped. In fact they were
damaged when they were received by the carrier. The plaintiff paid
for them upon receiving the shipping documents.
219upra, notes (186), (168), (93).
"100 U. S. 195 (1879).
=° Mr. Chief Justice Waite, Swayne and Bradley, J. J., concurring
dissented: The defendant had carelessly issued a certificate which he
might reasonably know would be relied upon by some third paitty in
some business transaction. He should be responsible for that loss. This
Is probably the foundation of the rule that liability in this situation is
dependent upon knowledge of intended reliance of a particular plaintiff.
See Columbia Law Review, 858 at p. 861 (n), (15).
21181 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. 183 (1910).
-Supra, note (209).
-- See discussion in the text of the second criticism, supra, note
(147), of Craig v. Anyon, supra, note (142).
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The case of Gordon v. Liviiigston is often cited 14 as an
application of the doctrine for the negligent issue of a grain
inspector's certificate. The language of the opinion does speak
of an absence of tort duty unless contractual privity can be-
found. The facts of the case, however, would lead one to be-
lieve that the petition was, or might have been, dismissed because
there was no evidence of negligence upon the part of the de-
feudant.2 15 The same treatment 216 has been given to Kad v.
Love.21 7 It might likewise be distinguished upon its facts. Here
the owner of real property in Jersey City paid a tax and re-
ceived a receipt from the tax collector. This receipt was sub-
sequently exhibited to the plaintiff who purchased the property
upon the representation that the tax had been paid. The check
given in payment was dishonored and the city enforced the
taxes against the plaintiff. He then sought to recover against
the defendant collector for the negligent issue of the tax certifi-
cate. In denying recovery the court stressed the fact that the
defendant was neither required nor authorized by statute to
issue a certificate. The receipt was to be' considered, then, in
the same light as the ordinary business receipt. These are ordi-
narily issued upon the presentation of a check and before the
check has been honored. Though the opinion did not advance
the reason, it seems that the case might have been decided for
the defendant upon the ground of contributory negligence. The
doctrine of the co-extensiveness of tort duty and contractual
privity is fairly supported by Nationa Iron and Steel Co. v.
Hunt,218 and Love v. Mack.2 19 Humpltrey v. Brown
220 presents
31 Columbia Law Review 858, at p. 862, note (22); 40 Yale Law
Journal 128.
The defendant in this case was a grain inspector and the plaintiff
was a purchaser who paid for it relying upon his certificate that it
was, "No. 1 Red Winter Wheat." In fact a paraof the wheat was "No.
2" which was of lesser value. The plaintiff lhad to respond to its
vendors for the inferior quality of wheat. The original seller had in-
structed the elevator officials to mix the wheat so that it would more
nearlycorrespond to the new standard grade which had been adopted
since his sale to the plainitff. They also instructed the elevator officials
to keep this a secret from the defendant inspector. The failure to
detect this fraudulent scheme hardly amounted to negligence upon the.
part of the defendant. "
;1 Supra, note (214).
'37 N. J. L. 5 (1874).
312 Ill. 245, 143 N. E. 833 (1924). The defendant inspected steel
rails upon two occasions. Upon the first there was a favorable cer-
tificate. Upon the last, the certificate stated they were not "first-clasa
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a more doubtful authority. This was an action brought by a
ship owner because of the negligent survey of his yacht by one
acting for the Society of Lloyd's Register. The ship was re-
ported to be in good condition when in fact the main mast was.
decayed. Though the opinion was written in terms of "privity"
and "duty", there was a stipulation by the Society exempting
it from liability for negligence. The evidence of damage in
the case was also doubtful.
(b) Exceptions to the Rule that Tort Duty and Contractual
Privity are Coterminous.
(1) Liability of Those Engaged in a Public Calling.
It was early decided that those engaged in a calling which
"was affected with a public interest were liable for negligence
to third parties with whom they had no contractual relation.
This was true in England where the restriction22 1 upon tort
duty wai first established. In Peppin v. Shephard 22 an action
was brought for negligently treating the wound of plaintiff..
Recovery was permitted even though the defendant was em-
ployed by the plaintiff's husband. This relationship between
the plaintiff and the party engaging the defendant weakens the-
authority of the case. It might well be said by virtue of that
relationship a status of "privity" was established between the
plaintiff and the defendant. 223 The court, however, placed the-
duty of defendant upon the necessity of protecting the public
interest.; 24  The decision might be explained upon the basis of
the nature of the injury, resulting from the negligence. Heree
the injury was physical injury rather than financial loss. That
explanation loses its force, however, when considered with
ifarriot v. Plemption.225  The defendant, as the result of a
relaying rails." The purchaser who relied upon the first certificate and
was prevented from selling by the last inspection brought the action.
A judgment for the defendant was entered because of a lack of duty.
93 L. T. 352 (1905).
45 T. L. R. 297.
mnupra, note (200).
11 Price 400, 147 Eng. Rep. 512" (1822).
2"Supra, note (179).
21 "It would be a most mischievous consequence if this declaration
could not.be sustained. In the practice of surgery, particularly the
public are exposed to great risks from the number of ignorant persons
professing a knowledge of the art without the least pretensions to the
necessary qualifications."
m166 Mass. 585 (1896).
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negligent diagnosis of the plaintiff, uttered a defamatory state-
ment. An action of slander was not maintainable because the
statement was privileged. The court held that the petition
stated a cause of action under the theory of negligence. The ex-
ception of the persons belonging to a public calling is further
substantiated by the duty of a telegraph company to the ad-
dressee. Recovery is permitted by the recipient for the negli-
gent transmission of a message even though it is paid for by the
sender. 226  Some 227 have said, however, that this is not an ex-
ception, as the rule may be brought within the doctrine of con-
tractual privity.
From the beginning it has been insisted that public ac-
-countants should be brought within this exception. A review228
of Landell v. Lybrand 29 agreed that the reasons for the result
of that case were in accord with established precedent, but ques-
tioned its consequences. It insisted that if the courts were not
willing to impose liability, it should be done by legislative
-enactment. The decision of the Appellate Division 230  in
Ultramares v. Touche was readily accepted 23 1 as being in accord
witl the rule urged 23 2 in Landell v. Lybrand, supra. Here it
stated 233 that by "economic necessity" the profession of Public
Accountant amounted to a public calling. Though the result of
the decision was approved, regret was expressed that liability
had not been imposed by legislative enactment. This it was
thought would have permitted members of the profession an
-opportunity to make an adjustment in their fees and to perfect
insurance against liability. The Court of Appeals, 23 4 hoiever,
-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, 21 N. E. 4
(1889).
2 3 Dakota Law Review 381, at p. 382, states that the basis for the
-decision is that the addressee is the express beneficiary of the contract,
citing Shearman and Redfield, Law of Negligence, Vol. 2 (6th ed.-
1913), Section 343.
"' 29 Yale Law Journal 234.
2z 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919).
243 N. Y. S. 179 (1930).
2 ' 40 Yale Law Journal 128.
21Supra, note (228).
- Supra, note (231). For the test of the importance of the busi-
ness to the public in determining whether it is a common calling see
75 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 411 (1927).
211 174 N. E. 441, at p. 448: "Public accountants are public only in
the sense that their services are offered to anyone who choose to em-
ploy them. This is far from saying that those who do not employ them
.are In the same position as those who do."
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denied that public accountants had the characteristic of a,
"public calling' which would subject them to liability. It has
been suggested that the opposite result could have been reached-
had the- court so desired.2 5  The court did have State ex Rel.
Short v. Riedel1286 for authority, though this ease was appar-
ently not called to its attention. This case might cast doubt.
upon the constitutionality of a statute imposing liability as
recommended above.237 It is true, however, that some businesses
may be regulated in one respect and not in another.2 38 Statutes
of identical nature have been enacted applying to title ab-
stracters. 230
(2) The Maker of a Dangerous Instrumentality.
The rule that the maker of a dangerous instrumentality owes
a duty imposed by law to persons with whom there is no,
contractual privity, grew out of a class of cases that established
the contrary rule in the first instance. If we pause to observe
the development of the law which first gave rise to the absence
of duty; its abrogation by this exception; and finally its express
reversal in the very class of cases that first denied duty; we
cannot but question its tenacious maintenance in another class.
of cases, which at the best are only supported by way of analogy.
Winterbottom v. Wright240 apparently established the rule
denying duty in the absence of contractual privity. This it
will be remembered, 241 involvied the negligent construction of a,
coach and the injury of one other than the vendee. Reasons of
216 Cornell Law Quarterly 419, at p. 426: "And might not the
court, had it so desired, have considered that a public accountant Is-
engaged in a public calling?"
2Supra, note (14).
2"Supra, note (228).
m Cap. F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities Co., 180 Ark. 720,
22 S. W. (2) 993, 68 A. L. R. 1018 (1930). In this case the section of
the statute fixing the price of ice was upheld; that requiring a certifi-
cate of public necessity and convenience was declared unconstitutional.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 52 Fed. (2d) 349 (1931), affirmed'
52 S. Ct. Rep. 371 (1932).
See 31 Columbia Law Review 858, at p. 862 (a) (20).
1 M. and W. 109.
The defendant contracted with the Postmaster-General to furnislr
a mail coach. The plaintiff's master contracted to furnish horses for
the coach along the line. By reason of the defective construction, the.
plaintiff was injured.
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-substance supporting the decision are hard to fnd.2 4 2  The
court apparently hesitated to extend liability for fear of in-
creasing the number of law suits and deterring prudent trades-
men from engaging in useful occupations. 243 The dissatisfac-
tion with this rule may be evidenced by the case of Thomas v.
Winchester.244 The court quite readily seized upon the theory
that an article imminently dangerous to human life should be an
*exQeption to the rule of absence of duty between the manu-
facturer and the consumer. The negligent mislabeling of a
poisonous drug was therefore sufficient to raise a duty between
the maker and the remote vendee. This opening wedge was a
welcome device for the courts. to emasculate the rule of Winter-
bottom v. Wright.245 The decision that a scaffold,246 a derrick
rope,247 an elevator,248 a siphon bottle 249 and a coffee urn25 0
were imminently dangerous to human life are evidence of the
dissatisfaction with the rule that tort duty and contractual
privity are co-extensive.
The invention and the almost universal use of thle auto-
mobile emphasized the serious consequences of the results pro-
4duced by the rule of Winterbottom v. Wright.2 51 Here it should
be noted that the situation is practically the same as in that
case. Of course the substitution of mechanical power with in-
creased speed and wider possibilities of accidents weigh heavily,
in favor of the interest of the consumer and against the manu-
facturer. Judge Carroll in Old Motor Works v. Shaffer252 was
apparently impressed with this consideration. The decision for
the plaintiff was placed upon this ground. Later McPherson v.
212 The rule "seems to savour strongly of that scholasticism which
so often has led the English courts to emphasize the shadow and ignore
the substance of a judicial situation." Negligence in Relation to
Prvity of Contract, 16 Law Quarterly Review, 168, at p. 172.
43Doubt was expressed upon the ability of the lawyer to pass upon
the operation of economic forces. Supra, note t(242).
26 N. Y. 397 (1852).
Supra, note (240).
Delvine v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470.
211 Davies v. Pelham Hod Elevator 'Co., 65 Hun. 573, 20 N. Y. S. 523.
"Kohner v. Otis Elevator Go., 96 N. Y. App. Div. 169, 89 N. Y. S.
185.
Lorgesen v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 156, 84 N. E. 956.
2S Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E. 1063.
21Supra, notes (245), (240).
145 Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047 (1911). The plaintiff, a passenger
In a car, was injured when the rumble seat, which was built upon a
box, gave way while going up a steep grade.
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Buick25 3 also allowed recovery when the user of a car was in-
jured in accident which resulted from a defective wheel. The
negligent inspection by the manufacturer rendered him liable
to the consumer. This case abandoned the overused fiction of
a dangerous instrumentality, and substituted the probability of
harm or the foreseeability o~f injury as the test of duty.254
Since the cases, which established the rule that tort duty and
contractual privity were coterminous, have by subsequent de-
velopment practically refuted the doctrine ;255 it does not seem to
be an insurmountable obstacle to imposing liability upon public
accountants to third parties.
(3) Liability for Negligent Advertisements.
The exception that the manufacturer who negligently ad-
vertises his product is liable for injury to a member of the
public is likewise a refutation of the doctrine of 'Winterbottom
v. Wright,25 6 which was followed in Ultramares v. Touche2 57 and
Landell v. ILybrand.258 The rule is well illustrated by Crist v.
Art Metal Works. 259 Here the plaintiff sued the manufacturer
for the negligent advertisement of a toy pistol which resulted
in the serious injury of a twelve year old boy. The toy was
of such a character that it could not be said to be an inherently
dangerous object. The theory of the complaint was that the
defendant had advertised it as "perfectly harmless". While
the child was playing with the toy during the Christmas holi-
days, the sparks discharged therefrom ignited the beard of a
Santa Claus costume. The child was severely burned. The
court held that the facts stated a cause of action. The basis of
the decision was the negligent failure to disclose the dangerous
potentialities of the toy. The pistol could not be said to be
dangerous when used for any purpose. Neither was there any
defect in its construction. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.2
60
- 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916 F. 697.
='The results and the reasons supporting it have been commended.
16 Columbia Law Review 428, 29 Harvard Law Review 866.
=Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Im.
mediate Vendees, 45 Law Quarterly Review 343 (1929).
"zSupra, notes (251), (245), (240).
0' Supra, notes (193), (186), (168), (93).
-u epra, note (173).
230 App. Div. 114, 243 N. Y. S. 496, aff'd 175 N. E. 341.
250 Ill. App. Div. 340 (1929).
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reached the opposite result from Crist v. Art Metal Works. 262
The two cases involved injuries suffered from the use of the.
identical toy. The injured child, in the latter, fired the pistol
while drawing gasoline from a tank, and as a result he was
severely burned. The cases are hard to distinguish though it
has been said2 62 that in the latter the contributory negligence.
of the plaintiff justified the court in directing a verdict for the
defendant. Henry v. Crook262 also permitted recovery for fail-
ing to give notice of the dangerous potentialities of the article
advertised. The plaintiff's dress in this instance was. ignited'
by a sparkler. Though there was a notice264 of possible harm,
it was held to be insufficient. Rosenbah v. General Electria
CO.265 held that an article that was dangerously packed 266 would
g ve rise to a cause of action. In this case blocks of wood had
been placed in an electrical transformer in order to hold the
coils intact during shipment. The purchaser failed to remove
them. When put to use, the blocks created a-short circuit which
caused an explosion. An employee of the purchaser was killed.
The court held that notwithstanding the lack of privity be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant, and the possible negli-
gence of the purchaser, the defendant was liable.
Historically, the doctrine of Winterbottom v. Wright
2 6
seems to be traceable to the old technicalities resulting from the
niceties of the forms of action in common law pleading. Thus
it was reasoned, that in no case of a tort arising out of a con-
tract, could an action be maintaindd except in those instances in
which an action upon the contract was maintainable. This rule,
coupled with the elementary proposition that none save parties
to contracts may sue thereon, produced the deduction that
torts arising out of a contractual relationship were not action-
able by strangers to the contract. Thisodeduction has been
Supra, note (259).
16 Cornell Law Quarterly 125, at p. 129. The facts showed that
the child hefd the muzzle of the pistol about five inches from the flow-
ing gasoline.
202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. S. 642.
O' The container had a warning "not to touch the wire."
-236 N. Y. 227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923).
2 Crane, J., said there was no distinction between a defective in-
strument and a perfect instrument defectively and dangerously packed.
"Supra, notes (256), (251), (245), (240).
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challenged forcibly. 2 s  In all cases which we have examined
upon this subject of tort liability in the absence of contractual
privity, the trend seems to be away from the original holding
denying liability. Especially is this true in those cases which
result in physical injuries. Why, then, should the courts cling
to the doctrine when the injury consists in the loss of property?
Such an artificial distinction seems to overlook the very spirit
of an action at law to recover damages. The purpose of that
action is compensatory. It is more nearly realized when the
cause of the complaint is a diminution of one's financial estate
than in the case of physical injuries.
(2) OTHER THEoRrEs op LIABILITY.
(a) Fraud.
The court in Ultramares v. Touche2 9 stated that upon the
facts presented the case should be submitted upon the issue of
fraud. This is again the language of legal conclusions, and has
raised the question of just what is meant by that descriptive
phrase. Not only has the question been raised before the
accounting profession,2 70 but the courts in many jurisdictions
have cited the case as sustaining various meanings of fraud.
Fraud usually consists of intentionally misleading another.
This may result from stating as a fact that which one knows,
does not exist. Or if one states a thing as true while conscious
of a lack of knowledge upon the matter, he is guilty of inten-
tionally misleading the person to whom the statement is made.
This does not mean that the party speaks maliciously in the
actual sense. It does not mean that the statement is accompanied
by a desire to indict harm or injury. In fact, the speakers may
actually hope that his audience will be -benefited or that the
future will prove his assertion to be true. Notwithstanding
these laudable aims, if they are coupled with an intention to
"It is one thing to say that a party to a contract can recover,
whatever his form of action, only when there has been a breach of
contract. It is quite another to say that this implies the corollary that
a stranger to the contract, being unable to sue upon it is unable to sue
at all." Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract, 16 Law Quar-
terly Review 168.
Supra, notes (257), (193), (186), (168), (93).




mislead, the statement is properly considered as fraudulent.271
This is apparently the meaning of the decision of the House of
Lords27 2 in Derry v. Peek.27 3 Some courts in this country have
followed the Court of Appeals' 274 decision in that case, however.
Other states have adopted the Court of Appeals' view by
statutory enactment.
275
The view of the House of Lords upon this subject was ap-
parently the rule in New York. In Reno v. Bu 2 7 13 an action
was brought by a purchaser of stock in a corporation against
the directors who had authorized and approved a banking circu-
lar, issued for the purpose of selling the stock. The judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed because, under the instructions of
the trial court, the plaintiff might have recovered upon conduct
which at the most amounted to negligence. "'Representation,
falsity, scienter, deception and damage" were said by the
court2 77 to be necessary elements of the action. Following
Glanzer v. Shephard275 it was thought 279 that the results of
Reno v. BuZ1280 would have been otherwise, had the complaint
sounded in negligence. The result of Ultramares v. Touche
281
probably alters the basis for this prophecy.
. Did it likewise change the rule upon fraud by indicating
that negligence would raise an inference of fraud? Did the
court mean to imply that a statement, though honestly -made, if
made without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true,
would be sufficient to sustain an action for fraud? Though sub-
sequent cases 28 2 in New York have thrown little light upon the
2nMisrepresentations as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, Bohlen,
42 Harvard Law Review 733.
-2 Supra, note (172).
'"Supra, note (170).
^1 TrPimble v. Reid, 97 Ky. 713, 31 S. W. 861 (1895); Parette v.
Ravenock, 81 Mo. Ap. 494 (1899).
. California Civil Code (Deering), Section 1572; supra, note 270,
at page 736
6 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919).
2n Citing Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. 337 (1889).
?8233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
36 Harvard Law Review 114.
Supra, note (276).
Supra, notes (269), (257), (193), (186), (168), (93).
People v. Mancuso, et al., 255 N. Y. 463, 175 N. E. 177, at p. 184
(1931), repeated the proposition that negligence itself may raise an
inference of fraud. People v. Mangan, et al., 252 X. Y. S. 45 (1931),
at p. 51, stated that fraud may include pretense of knowledge where
there Is no knowledge.
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subject that is the view taken in some jurisdictions upon the
decision.28 3 The language of the Massachusetts court would
certainly indicate that it believed the New York court had
switched from the view of the House of Lords28 4 to that of the
Court of Appeals 28 5 in Derry v. Peek.28 6  In citing Ultramares
v. Touche, supra, McLearn Hill, 287 stated that words and con-
duct free from an intentional purpose to deceive may constitute
fraud under appropriate circumstances. The same is true of
the California court. This jurisdiction, we have said,288 adopted
the negligent theory of fraud by statute. Washington Lumber
and Millwork Co. v. McGuire,28 9 in construing that statute290
cited Ultramares v. Touche, supra, for the proposition that
actionable deceit may be based upon negligence as well as on
willful misrepresentations.
Notwithstanding this apparent confusion, it is believed that
the New York court did not intend to change its rule upon the
elements of fraud. It has been one of the few jurisdictionS2 91
to properly distinguish between the actions for negligent
language and fraudulent statements. To hold that Ultramares
v. Touche292 adopted the rule of fraud credited to it by the
Massachusetts and California courts would make that opinion
self-contradictory. If by that decision the rule was changed
from its prior view 293 upon fraud, the court would be in the
anomolous position of denying recovery for negligence and al-
lowing it at the same time by calling it fraud. It is believed
that the court had reference to statements grossly negligent.
The rule that gross negligence will raise an inference of fraud,
so that evidence to that effect must be submitted to a jury, is
analogous to the rule in defamation, that evidence of negligence
28I3 upra, notes (281), (269), (257), (193), (186), (168), (93).
2lSupra, notes (272), (172).
2,Supra, note (171).
mHupra, notes (273), (170).
177 N. E. (Mass.) 617, at p. 621.
m Supra, note (275).
",1 Pac. (2d) Cal. 437 (1931).
."Section 1710 of California Civil Code, Deering (1923), defines
deceit: "The assertion of a fact of that which is not true by one who
has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true."
29 Misrepresentations as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42
Harvard Law Review 733.




is admissible as an inference of malice which will defeat a con-
ditional privilege.294
(b) Warranty.
Much of the uncertainty that has resulted from the court's
decision 295 that the accountants were liable to thiird parties for
fraud, and the meaning of that word, is due to the confusion of
that theory of liability with liability for bteach of warranty.
Some296 have stated that the important element of the Ultra-
mares opinion is that which deals with fraud. In analyzing
the meaning of the court upon that phase of the case, it was
pointed out that the absence of knowledge and not the absence
of belief was the important thing in finding a false financial
statement fraudulent. And, indeed, there is language in the
opinion2.9 7 to justify this conclusion.
There are many cases which hold that if. a person makes a
statement of a-fact, true to his own knowledge, then he is liable
if that statement is false, even though he believed it to be true.
In Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt,2 98 an action of deceit was
brought against the vendor of a mineral lease for misrepresent-
ing the quantity of ore. Though the vendor did not know that
his statements were false, he knew that their accuracy depended
upon a survey, one line of which had been assumed. The sur-
vey proved to be erroneous. In awarding judgment for the
plaintiff, the court emphasized the falsity of the statement2 99
rather than the intention to mislead. According to this view,
if the statement is false, scienter is apparently presumed. 300 In
2"Acknowledgment is made to Dean Young B. Smith, Law School
of Columbia University. For the rule upon defamation, see 16 Harvard
Law Review 71; for an explanation of the contrary view, see 57 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 243.
2Ultramares v. Touche, smpra, notes (292),- (283), (281), (269),
(257), (193), (186), (168), (93).
21The Liability of the Public Accountant, Roger N. Baldwin, 52
Journal of Accountancy 342 (1931).
"The defendants stated as a fact, true to their own knowledge,
that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account.
If their statement was false they are not to be exonerated because
they believe it to be true." Cardozo, J., 174 N. E. 441, at p. 448.
21 147 Mass. 403, 18 N. 91. 168 (1888).
"' "The fraud consists in stating that the party knows that the
thing exists, when he does not know it to exist; and if he does not
know it he must ordinarily be deemed to know that he does not."
I This case ascribed "to a person who makes the statement an
introspective omniscience which, however common in New England,
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Iadcock v. Osmer3° ' a debtor of the defendant was informed
that he would have to pay. In order to help the debtor raise
funds with which to meet the obligation, the defendant wrote
a letter 30 2 recommending their credit. The debtor was insolvent
at the time. The court found that the defendant may have be-
lieved3 0 3 their credit to be good, but he did not know whether
it was good or not. In permitting the plaintiff to recover the
,Court of Appeals held that the instructions30 4 of the trial court
were not too favorable to the plaintiff. In so doing, the emphasis
again was placed upon the falsity of the statement. Looking at
the case for what it actually decided, it may be readily sustained.
The sole question before the appellate court was the correctness
of the instructions. They were correct in that the conduct con-
demned by them was the pretense of knowledge where there was
none. This would amount to intentionally misleading another
and fraud in its generally accepted sense. We should question
the language of the opinion that a statement made of a fact, true
to the knowledge of the speaker, is fraudulent if false, notwith-
standing belief in its truth. Such a holding would, in effect,
amount to a warranty that the statement was true. The facts
do not disclose that the plainiff'was a proper party to complain
of a breach of warranty.
- Courts are treading upon dangerous ground, when they
treat a statement of fact true to the knowledge of the speaker,
as fraudulent, if false. They are then passing from the realm
of intentional wrong into the field of contract law. It amounts
to a confusion of tort principles with those of contract.30 5
is rarely if ever encountered elsewhere." Francis Bohlen, Misrepresenta-
tions as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 Harvard Law Review 733,
at p. 744.
1 153 N. Y. 604, 47 N. E. 923 (1897).
"2"Mr. Hadcock: The Browns are good for what money you let
them have."
1' This finding of the court is difficult to sustain since the debtor
informed the defendant that he could not pay when requested. Were
it not for the matter of the instructions, the case might have well been
based upon the intention of the defendant to mislead.
:0 The instructions were: "That if he made the statement that
they were good as a fact, not as an opinion, without knowing whether
it was true or not, then it was falsd in the sense that he made a state-
ment of fact as though he knew it to be true, which he did not know
to be true."
'0 Supra, note (300). Wsmpne v. Patterson, 117 S. W. (Tex. Civ.
Ap.) 1034, is cited as being one of the few courts to recognize the true
nature of this liability.
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Most of the cases that assert this principle are dealing with
misrepresentations between parties to contracts. As such,.
making a statement true to the personal knowledge of the
speak.er, may well be taken to amount to a warranty that the
statement is true. It may also be applied as long as the con-
tractual relationship exists. It is submitted that the rule30
that certified public accountants are liable for the falsity of
their statements, when stated as facts true to their personal
knowledge, should not be extended to "third parties", with
whom there is no contractual relationship. The cases cited30 7
to sustain that proposition, present representations inducing the
formation of contracts. There is justification for saying that
the party making the representation in those cases,, warranted
their verity and should not be exonerated merely because he
believed the statements to be true. The failure to distinguish
this rule as an extension of the law of warranty, rather than
defining the limits of fraudulent statements, would readily
lead to its misapplication.
IV. SUAMARY.
The advent of new taxes and new business customs has in-
creased the demand for the services of the accountant. Speciali-
zation and the delegation of duties have become necessary.
Seasonal work has complicated the selection of the personnel of
the accounting profession. The legal liability of members of the
profession is a novel question of increasing importance. There
are no legal requirements to be complied with before engaging
in the profession. In the United States there have been created
by the legislatures, examining boards. These exercise a selec-
tive process in determining the members of the profession who
are proficient enough to be certified by the state as public
accountants. Successful applicants in these tests may hold
themselves out as Certified Public Accountants. Usually there
are statutes prohibiting others from exercising this privilege.
The power of the state to exercise this selective process will not
be given extra-territorial effect. Each state may stipulate upon
what terms reciprocity shall exist between it and other states.
3"Supra, note (297).
mLehigh Zinc and Iron Co. v. Bamford, 150 U. S. 665, 14 S. Ct.
219, 37 L. Ed. 1215; Chathar Furnace Co. v. Moffat, 147 Mass. 403, 1
N. E. 168, 9 Am. St. Rep. 727.
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The courts have declared that public accountants are mem-
bers of a learned profession. As such, they warrant the exer-
cise of the degree of skill that is common in the profession.
Average skill is a question of fact. Circumstances, statutes, and
contracts may alter the degree of skill that is required to be
exercised. Honesty and integrity in the performance of the
work are fundamental requirements, universally observed. The
failure to detect fraud may or may not be negligence. The
nature of the fraudulent scheme, the verification that would be
necessary to detect it, and the verification that was made are
controlling. An auditor is not an insurer of the accuracy of
his work. He should be liable for the failure to know the
general principles of law of special significance to his practice.
The legal requirements for the verification of cash are
stringent. The courts have not relaxed these requirements, even
when the parties have limited the scope and purpose of the
audit. In the verification of receivables the value must be
taken into consideration, and the expression given thereto in
terms understandable by the person to whom the statement is
addressed. Though there have been cases which stated that
there was no duty to segregate receivables from affiliates, later
legislative enactment in that jurisdiction has made it manda-
tory. It seems that the legislative policy is preferable to the
decision of the court upon.this practice. Inflation of receivables
should be detected by verification of supporting memoranda.
It has been said. by way of dictum that a verification of securities
in the hands of a depository was necessary. The courts are
apparently reluctant to impose liability for failing to detect
errors in inventories. The problem is a difficult one, but it is
quite futile to impose stringent requirements for the verifica-
tion of some accounts such as cash, receivables and investments,
and to relax those requirements with inventories. By the
manipulation of this account fraud is easily perpetrated. The
courts have often stated that it is not the auditor's duty to,
"take stock". Some have suggested, however, that explanation&
should be sought by them if the occasion demands it. The dis-
covery of errors and discrepancies in inventories should exact
greater care and caution in the performance of the audit. It is
legally proper to accept certificates of officers and employees of
the business under audit as to quantities and estimates of in-
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ventories, unless the auditor has reason to believe they are dis-
honest. Good accounting practice requires that the auditor
make inquiry to ascertain the competency of these officials be-
fore accepting their .certificates.
Care should be exercised by the auditor to detect the sup-
pression or inflation of liabilities. By the latter the entrepre-
neur, who is probably the client, will suffer injury; by the
former a creditor is likely to suffer injury. In order to detect
liabilities, the minutes of the company should be examined. The
auditor's right to all records ought to be unlimited. If this
right is not recognized, the person making the audit should
exercise self-help by a refusal to continue the engagement. The
certificates and reports of the auditors should be unequivocal
and couched in language that is capable of understanding. The
errors of making an audit may or may not be the proximate
cause of injury. The usual rules should govern the application
of this defense. Sometimes it is permitted. Other authorities
deny that it has any application in an action against an account-
ant. Especially is this true when the action is instituted by the
client. The action may well be based upon negligence, however,
and it seems that contributory negligence might properly be
asserted as a defense. As a practical matter it is, and should be,
a difficult defense to prove. When the c6urts, as a matter of law,
set aside a verdict for a plaintiff for this reason, they are over-
looking the practical neecessities of division of labor under
capitalistic production.
The measure of 'damages might be that which is usual for
the breach of a contract or the commission of a tort. Two juris-
dictions have refused to permit the recovery of the defalcations
subsequent to *the negligent audit. This was considered as the
remote consequence of the breach and not within the contem-
plation of the parties when the agreement for the audit was
made. In one of these, the defense of contributory negligence
-and the contract measure of damages were applied in the same
case. Some cases have permitted the recovery of the subsequent
embezzlements. If the complainant can properly state a cause
of action in tort, there is no apparent reason why he should not
recover for money embezzled as a consequence of, and subse-
quen to, the negligent audit.
Two jurisdictions have held that accountants are not liable
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-to parties other than those for whom they have agreed to make
the audit. In so holding they made tort duty coterminous, with
.contractual privity. The logic of the New York case is unassail-
-able. One gathers, however, that the court was more troubled
with the practical hardships of imposing liability than it was
with legal precedent. There are authorities both allowing and
,denying liability for negligent language. The cases in which
liability has been imposed present facts, which bring the party
recovering within the class of persons who could recover upon
the contract that was responsible for the utterance of the
language. The doctrine that tort duty and contractual privity
are coterminous has been applied in eases of the certifiefiates of
title abstracters, tax collectors and inspectors of grain and
steel. There are many exceptions to the rule. Those that are
-engaged in a public calling are liable for negligence to others
in the absence of a contractual relationship. This was the main
basis for criticising the first case that denied liability of public
.accountants. The rule that tort duty and contractual privity
are co-extensive was first limited, and later practically emascu-
lated by the exception applying to makers of dangerous instru-
mentalities. The rule is rarely observed except when the injury
-consists of the diminution of one's financial estate. The absence
of privity does not excuse the negligent advertiser. Historically.
it has been ascribed to the rationalizations of the technicalities
resulting from the various* forms of action in common law plead-
ing, The rule has been condemned as illogical when considered
with the general fundamental principles of the law of negli-
gence. There are other theories of liability to persons with
whom public accountants have no contractual relationship.
'They are usually embraced with tle troublesome "catch-all"-
fraud. The liability of public accountants under this theory
-should be limited to the cases in which they intentionally mis-
lead another. To say that public accountants make a statement
of fact, true to their own knowledge, and that they are liable if
it is false, regardless of honesty, is to impose liability for a
breach of warranty. This liability should not be imposed in
-favor of third parties.
In conclusion, it is submitted that between auditor and
,client the legal requirements of skill in making an audit have
not reached a satisfactory consistency. In certain phases of
KRNTucxy LAw JouRNAL
the audit the legal requirements are very strict, and in other
phases they are less than that which is considered good account-
ing practice. It is desirable to have legal duty and good prac-
tice conform. By this policy, accounting records and periodical
audits will become a more perfect mechanism for business con-
trol. The lack of liability to third parties ha§ been adversely
criticised in the majority of intances.30 8 The greatest incon-
venience imposed by the Ultramares case will probably be the
failure of the business community to understand its significance
when considered with the Glanzer case, and the failure to con-
form business practice with the two. If we accept the rule in
New York as the law upon the subject, it behooves the creditor
or investor to procure financial statements addressed directly
to him. All financial statements are not unreliable, in a legal
sense, but only those that are issued in blank to the- public
generally.
0 16 Cornell Law Quarterly 419; 31 Columbia Law Review 858; 19
California Law Review 454, while approving the logic of the opinion
in Ultramares v. Touche, supra, question the results. 17 Virginia Law
Review 701, upholds both the reasons and the result. This analysis is
not very clear and seems contrary to the holding of the principal case.
3 Dakota Law Review 381 approves the reasons of the opinion, an
makes no comment upon the result.
